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General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title 
By David Frisch* and john D. Wladis** 
This survey reviews recent case law and related developments under articles 
1, 2, 6, and 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "Code"). 
INTERACTION OF TORT AND CONTRACT 
Courts continue to endorse the economic loss doctrine in commercial disputes. 
Under that doctrine a commercial buyer is permitted to sue the seller or 
manufacturer of defective goods only in contract and not in tort if the loss the 
buyer suffered is purely economic. If the buyer suffers personal injury or 
property damage to property other than the goods sold the economic loss 
doctrine does not apply and the buyer can sue in tort as well as contract. 
In Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. Co.,1 
the Ohio Supreme Court applied the economic loss doctrine to bar suit in tort by 
a commercial buyer against its seller where the buyer suffered economic loss 
and property damage to the goods themselves. There the seller designed and 
constructed an arch dryer used to evaporate moisture from solvents used by the 
buyer. The dryer failed to work properly causing damage to components of the 
dryer. The buyer sued in both contract and tort for repair costs and consequen-
tial damages, primarily extra expenses incurred during the times the dryer was 
not functioning. 2 The trial court granted summary judgment for the seller on all 
theories. On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed as to the tort claims but 
*Mr. Frisch is a member of the Florida and Rhode Island Bars and a professor of law at the 
Widener University School of Law. 
**Mr. Wladis is a member of the New York Bar and an associate professor of law at the Widener 
University School of Law. 
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Cook, Scott Cousins, Rudolphe J. A. deSeife, Donald W. Garland, Donald R. Hobbs, Thomas 
Holdych, Janet L. Richards, Diane Modes, Mark E. Roszkowski, William R. Waddell, William F. 
Young. 
L 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 88 (1989). 
2. This suit was initiated by the buyer against its insurers for refusal to provide insurance 
benefits. The insurers, as subrogees of the buyer's claims against the seller, filed third party claims 
against the seller. The court's opinion concerns these third party claims. 
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reversed and remanded as to the contract claims. 3 The tort claims were in 
negligence and strict liability in tort. As to these claims the court ruled that 
damage only to the goods themselves was covered by the economic loss doctrine 
so that the buyer could not sue the seller in tort for this damage or the related 
consequential damages.4 Of interest is the fact that the court adopted the risk of 
physical damage test approved by the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania Glass Sand 
Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.5 Under that test if the defect creates an 
unreasonable risk of personal injury or property damage the economic loss 
doctrine will not apply even though only the goods sold are damaged. However, 
it found the defect not to raise such a risk in this case. 
In Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A.G. rb' S., lnc. 6 the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that for the purpose of the economic loss doctrine contami-
nation of the plaintiff Board of Education's school buildings with asbestos 
particles from asbestos products supplied by defendants was property damage to 
property other than the goods sold, so that the Board of Education could 
maintain negligence and strict liability in tort claims against the suppliers of the 
asbestos. In so doing the court rejected the risk of physical injury test adopted by 
the Ohio Supreme Court case in Chemtrol Adhesives. The Illinois court ruled 
that what was required to recover in tort was a showing of actual personal 
injury or property damage to property other than the goods sold and not merely 
a defect creating the risk of such injury or damage. The court also cautioned 
that asbestos cases were "unique"; it admonished readers of the opinion that 
"the holding in this case should not be construed as an invitation to bring 
economic loss contract actions within the sphere of tort law through the use of 
some fictional property damage. "7 
In Lloyd Wood Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co.8 the Alabama Supreme 
Court adopted the economic loss doctrine in a case involving the commercial 
lease of a front-end loader. The loader suffered substantial fire damage caused 
by a ruptured hydraulic hose, The lessee's insurance company reimbursed it for 
the loss and apparently brought this suit to recover what it had paid. The court, 
concluding that this was a claim for property damage only to the goods leased, 
applied the economic loss doctrine and barred various tort claims. Several 
months later the Alabama Supreme Court extended the economic loss doctrine 
to a sale of a motor vehicle.9 
3. The court held it to be a question of fact whether timely notice of claim had been given under 
U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a). This aspect of the court's opinion is discussed infra text at notes 129-31. 
4. See also Northrup King Co. v. Ammons, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 836 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(applying North Carolina law) (Sale of seed to farmers. Crops failed because seed contaminated 
with bacterial rust. Negligence claim dismissed. Court opined that North Carolina would apply 
economic loss doctrine.). 
5. 652 F.2d 1165, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 521 (3d Cir. 1981). 
6. 131 Ill. 2d 428, 546 N.E.2d 580, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 90 (1989). 
7. 131 Ill. 2d at 445, 546 N.E.2d at 588, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 97. 
8. 543 So. 2d 671, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 899 (Ala. 1989). 
9. See Dairyland Ins. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 549 So. 2d 44, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
903 (Ala. 1989) discussed infra text at notes 82-87. 
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In Miller v. United States Steel Corp. 10 the Seventh Circuit, applying Wis-
consin law, applied the economic loss doctrine in a suit by a building owner 
against the manufacturer of steel sold to a subcontractor who fabricated it into 
steel panels that were then installed in the building. The owner sued in tort for 
the cost of replacing the panels. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court previously had adopted the economic loss doctrine in a case in 
which there was privity of contract between the parties. 11 It then opined that the 
same court would apply that doctrine even when the parties were not in privity. 
The building owner argued that the economic loss doctrine was inapplicable 
because water damage to the building caused by the defective panels was 
property damage to property other than the goods themselves. The court 
rejected this argument for two reasons: first the water damage was incidental;12 
second the building owner did not sue for that damage. 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Although the sufficiency of a writing under U.C.C. section 2-201 does not 
explicitly depend on the inclusion of any particular term, the contract is not 
enforceable beyond the quantity of goods "shown in such writing,"13 or "admit-
ted,"14 or "which have been received and accepted."15 Several cases decided this 
past year provide interesting examples of the impact of this requirement and 
underscore the need to seriously consider whether all references to quantity now 
contained in section 2-201 should be deleted if the statute survives any future 
revision of article 2.16 
10. 902 F.2d 573, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1990). 
11. See Sunnyslope Grading Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 437 
N.W.2d 213, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 652 (1989). 
12. See Chicago Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of America, Inc., 782 F.2d 723, 726-29 
(7th Cir. 1986). 
13. u.c.c. § 2-201(1). 
14. u.c.c. § 2-201(3)(b). 
15. U.C.C. § 2-201(3)(c). 
16. The Study Group appointed by the American Law Institute/Permanent Editorial Board to 
study article 2 has recommended in its Preliminary Report that if section 2-201 is not repealed, all 
references to quantity should be deleted. In its opinion, "(t)he effect of this requirement has been to 
induce courts to strain to find some quantity term to interpret and, in addition, to undercut the basic 
'gap filling' policies of Article 2, Part 3 without any evidence that fraud has been deterred or that 
the fact finding process was impaired." Rec. A2.2 (2)(b). 
At least one member of the subcommittee feels that the quantity provisions of section 2-201 
should not be eliminated. It is argued that the quantity term is designed to prevent fraud in the 
making of the most important term in a sales contract, and the only term that cannot be readily 
supplied by article 2 gap fillers. The quantity term places a limit on the size of the contract, and 
therefore the size of any fraudulently asserted contract. Preliminary Report, Permanent Editorial 
Board of U.C.C. and A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L., Article 2 Study Group, Part 2, Amendment of the 
Statute of Frauds, Rec. A2.2(A), 5, 6 (Mar. 1, 1990). 
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Illustrating the potential of a quantity requirement to undercut other sub-
stantive provisions of article 2 is jo-Ann, Inc. v. Al.fin Fragrances, Inc., 17 in 
which the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff-buyer, 
Jo-Ann. The only writing that in any way evidenced the quantity of goods 
involved was a telex sent by the defendant, stating, "our understanding is that 
you will be the exclusive distributor for the domestic market in Iceland." 
Following the lead of those courts which have concluded that the Code does not 
require the statement of a definite quantity in a requirements contract, 18 the 
court reasoned that practical considerations compel the same commercially-
minded approach to distributorship contracts.19 Because it would not be feasible 
to specify an exact quantity, the court concluded that the parties' statutory duty 
to use their "best efforts" would serve as a substitute by which to assess the limit 
of enforceability.20 
Similarly, in Zayre Corp. v. S.M. t/:r R. Co., Inc., 21 the plaintiff-seller argued 
that the absence of a definite quantity term was not fatal to its case because the 
contract was a requirements contract. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the case 
serves as an illustration of how not to proceed under the statute. On appeal, 
following the entry of summary judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff for the 
first time unleashed a barrage of arguments. For example, the lower court had 
held that an essential element of a requirements contract is a commitment by the 
buyer to purchase exclusively from the seller, and that such a promise was 
lacking in the writings (two letters) produced by the seller. Apparently, the 
seller never asserted in the lower court the existence of an explicit or implicit 
agreement on exclusivity nor explained how the two letters established a 
requirements contract. This failure, said the Seventh Circuit, made it unneces-
sary to consider the buyer's arguments and explanations on appeal.22 
17. 731 F. Supp. 149, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 782 (D.N.J. 1989). For an excellent discussion 
of this topic, see Bruckel, The Weed and the Web:§ 2-207's Corruption of the U.C.C. Substantive 
Provisions-The Quantity Problem, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 811 (1983). 
18. See, e.g., Slocomb Industries, Inc. v. Chelsea Industries, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1543 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983); Eastern Dental Corp. v. Issac Masel Co., 502 F. Supp. 1354, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1217 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
19. It was first necessary for the court to rule that exclusive distributorship contracts are subject 
to the Code. Although most courts would agree, see, e.g., Aaron E. Levine & Co. v. Calkcraft Paper 
Co., 429 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Cavalier Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 
53 Md. App. 379, 454 A.2d 367, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1081 (1983); Meuse-Rhine-Ijssel Cattle 
Breeders of Canada, Ltd. v. Y-Tex Corp., 590 P.2d 1306, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 292 (Wyo. 1979), 
some would not. See, e.g., Lorenz Supply Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 419 Mich. 610, 358 
N.W.2d 845, 39 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1169 (1984); Tile Craft Products Co., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 581 
S.W.2d 886 (Mo. App. 1979). 
20. See U.C.C. section 2-306(2) ("A lawful agreement ... for exclusive dealing ... imposes 
unless otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts to supply the goods and by the 
buyer to use best efforts to promote their sale."). 
21. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 465 (7th Cir. 1989). 
22. S.M. & R. also argued on appeal for the recognition of a "full-performance" common law 
exception to the statute which the Illinois appellate court has recognized in the context of U.C.C. 
section 8-319. This exception provides that if a party has wholly performed, the statute is satisfied if 
the party has nothing to do but await payment. However, the plaintiff cited no authority; the district 
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In Thomas]. Kline, Inc. v. Lorillard, lnc.,23 the Fourth Circuit also heard 
the argument that no specific quantity term was necessary because the contract 
was a requirements contract. There the letter sent by Lorillard, the defendant, 
to the plaintiff-buyer said, "We are pleased to inform you that your request to 
purchase Lorillard products on a direct basis has been approved . . . and you 
have been added to our direct list of customers for Full Line as successor to 
[Merrey] ," followed by a list of terms. Kline argued that the "direct basis" and 
"Full Line" language satisfactorily proved a quantity term. As part of the 
plaintiff's proof that the alleged agreement constituted a requirements contract, 
the district court allowed parol evidence on the meaning of the disputed terms. 
The Fourth Circuit held this to be error. Parol evidence is admissible to explain 
an imprecise statement of quantity, but not to supply the missing quantity term 
when the contract is silent. The court found the letter to be totally silent as to 
quantity, because there is no legal or definitional connection between these 
terms and "amount."24 
The court's analysis is questionable. Kline believed, based on industry experi-
ence and prior dealings with Lorillard, that the reference to "direct basis" 
meant he could purchase all his requirements on open credit. The jury appar-
ently agreed.25 The contract's silence results only from the court's refusal to 
elevate technical jargon and trade usage to the same level of legal relevance as 
everyday English. No reason for this discrimination is given. 
As in past years, there is no shortage of cases involving the merchant's 
exception to the statute of frauds under U.C.C. section 2-201(2). American 
Plastic Equipment, Inc. v. CBS Inc. 26 shows just how far courts are willing to 
go to find the requisite merchant status. The Second Circuit was quick to reject 
the assertion by CBS that it was not a merchant with respect to its sale of plastic 
toy molds. While CBS might not be a "merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind,''27 this definition is too narrow for purposes of U.C.C. section 2-201. To 
qualify as a merchant, all that is necessary is that one has knowledge of the 
relevant business practices involved. In this case CBS acquired merchant status 
based on knowledge which amounted to nothing more than "having sufficient 
familiarity with the postal system and the answering of mail. ... "28 
court mistakenly thought plaintiff was urging application of the U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c) 
exception and found S.M. & R. did not meet it. The Seventh Circuit stated that the full 
performance exception might apply, but since it is similar to U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c) and 
promissory estoppel, the district court's mistake was excusable and solely the fault of S.M. & R. 
23. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 61 (4th Cir. 1989). 
24. With the observation that "the issue is whether a one sentence letter obligates Lorillard to 
provide .Kline with unlimited credit for its unlimited tobacco requirements." Id. at 67, the court 
suggests its inability w fathom that arrangements of this sort would be reduced to anything less than 
a multi-page, detail driven document. 
25. According lo the dissenting judge, the jury's finding demonstrated the sufficiency of the 
writing. Id. at 68 (Sprouse, J., dissenting). 
26. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 848 (2d Cir. 1989). 
27. This is the narrow definition of merchant found in U.C.C. section 2-314. 
28. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 858. See Comment 2 to section 2-104 which states that under 
sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207, and 2-209 "almost every person in business" is a merchant under 
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Chambers Steel Engraving Corp. v. Tambrands, Inc. 29 raises an interesting 
issue under the specially manufactured goods exception of U.C.C. section 
2-201(3)(a), specifically: whether constructing a prototype constitutes a substan-
tial beginning to an alleged oral contract to manufacture additional production 
machines.30 The First Circuit agreed with the district court that the exception 
should be construed narrowly because of the fear of abuse by parties attempting 
to add additional quantities or other agreements to an established contract. The 
design and manufacture of the pr~totype (for which the plaintiff was paid in 
full), was not enough to constitute a substantial beginning of the alleged oral 
contract for 20-30 additional machines. 
The policy reflected in Chambers is the same as that supporting the "part 
performance" exception of U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c). Under this provision, 
partial performance takes the contract out of the statute only to the extent of the 
part performed. U.C.C. section 2-201(3)(c), like the Chambers result, prevents 
a party from using a small executed contract to support an· allegation (possibly 
fraudulent) that it was merely part of a larger contract. Presumably, this 
evidentiary bar would be lifted if the references to quantity in U.C.C. section 
2-201 are ever deleted. 
Finally, the litany of cases involving the effect of reliance on the statute of 
frauds continues. For those advocating a reliance exception, it was not a very 
good year.31 In view of the confusion surrounding this issue, a statutory 
resolution is needed. 
PAROL EVIDENCE 
A signed writing precludes the use of parol evidence to contradict any of its 
written terms, right? Not quite. The writing must be "intended by the parties 
as a final expression of their agreement."32 Two cases discuss this requirement. 
The first case, /ntercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.,33 decided by the Eleventh 
Circuit and applying Alabama law, concerned a written export distributor sales 
agreement. The agreement was the culmination of several draft contracts and 
extensive negotiations. It provided the distributor (Intercorp) with a nonexclu-
sive right to market the supplier's (Pennzoil) products within a stipulated 
territory in the Caribbean. Soon thereafter a dispute developed over the distrib-
utor's area. The distributor discovered that the supplier had agreed to permit 
section 2- to4( 1) "since the practices involved in the transaction are nonspecialized business practices 
such as answering mail." 
29. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1152 (1st Cir. 1990). 
30. The court held that the question of whether the facts satisfied the exception was a question 
for the court, not the jury. 
31. See Futch v. James River-Norwalk, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1395, to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 684 
(S.D. Miss. 1989) (promissory estoppel not available as an exception to the statute); International 
Products & Technologies, Inc. v. Iomega Corp., to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 694 (E.D. Pa. 1989) 
(same); Hoffmann v. Boone, 708 F. Supp. 78, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(estoppel principles are inapplicable because plaintiff has not suffered an unconscionable injury). 
32. u.c.c. § 2-202. 
33. 877 F.2d 1524. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 454 (1 Ith Cir. 1989). 
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another company to market the supplier's products on the island of Trinidad, 
which the distributor believed to be within its territory. Although prior drafts 
had included that island in the distributor's area, the final agreement did not. 
The relationship continued to deteriorate until the distributor sued for breach of 
the distribution agreement. The essence of the distributor's claim was that the 
supplier had violated the agreement by permitting others to market the sup-
plier's products in the distributor's area, including Trinidad. 
The distributor alleged that it had understood the agreement to include 
Trinidad within its territory. One of the supplier's agents testified that the 
failure to include Trinidad in the final agreement may have been a typographi-
cal error. The distributor also alleged that it had attempted to obtain an 
exclusive distributorship during the negotiations. It also alleged the supplier had 
responded that its legal department avoided using the term "exclusive" in its 
distribution agreements to avoid potential antitrust problems, but that it was the 
supplier's policy to treat the distribution agreements as exclusive. The supplier 
conceded that this colloquy had taken place but argued that neither party had 
intended this policy to be part of the final agreement. The trial judge evidently 
considered this evidence sufficient to show that the written distributor sales 
agreement had not been intended by the parties to be a final expression of their 
agreement. Therefore, it submitted to the jury the distributor's parol evidence as 
to what the agreement was. The jury returned a general verdict for the 
distributor on its breach of contract claim. 
On appeal, the supplier challenged the trial court's admission of parol 
evidence. It argued that the trial court misapplied the law by submitting that 
evidence to the jury without first making a finding that the written distributor 
sales agreement was not intended to be a final expression. The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed, concluding that the trial court implicitly had found the written 
agreement not to be a final expression and that, therefore, it was proper to 
submit the parol evidence to the jury. 
Though this case permits the use of parol evidence to contradict the terms of 
an extensively negotiated, signed contract between two commercial entities, it is 
correct in theory. A writing excludes parol evidence only if the writing is 
intended by the parties to be a final expression of their agreement.34 That 
question is for the court and in ruling on the question, the court considers all of 
the evidence, including the parol evidence.35 As a practical matter it will be very 
difficult to persuade a court that an extensively negotiated, signed contract 
between two commercial entities does not represent the final expression of their 
agreement. Consequently, parol evidence usually will be inadmissible to contra-
dict such a contract. However, in this case the party seeking to exclude the parol 
evidence did not flatly deny its existence. Instead the supplier admitted inform-
ing the distributor of its policy to treat its distributorship as exclusive; it also 
admitted that the exclusion of Trinidad from the written agreement may have 
34. u.c.c. § 2-202. 
35. 877 F.2d at 1529, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 460. See also Restatement (Second) Contracts 
§ 209 Comment c (1981). 
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been a typographical error. These admissions probably were crucial to the trial 
court's decision to admit the parol evidence.36 
In the second case, King v. Fordice37 a Texas appellate court permitted the 
admission of parol evidence to show that an exchange of mailgrams, which on 
their face appeared to be an offer and acceptance creating a contract for the sale 
of an airplane, were not so intended by the parties. In a suit by the seller for 
breach of contract based on the exchange of mailgrams, the buyer alleged that 
the parties had exchanged the mailgrams solely to enable the seller to get the 
plane to Dallas for inspection by the buyer. The trial court permitted this 
evidence to go to the jury, who determined that the exchange of mailgrams did 
not constitute an agreement. On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals affirmed 
the admission of parol evidence. It noted that at common law parol evidence had 
always been admissible to show that the parties had never intended a writing to 
be enforceable. The court then concluded that this aspect of the parol evidence 
rule survived the enactment of the article 2 parol evidence rule (section 2-202).38 
This result is correct. Section 2-202 seems to have been intended to modify 
portions of the common law parol evidence rule rather than to displace it 
entirely. The drafters' primary concern was two-fold.39 First, to make it clear 
that the rule does not exclude evidence of commercial meaning supplied by 
course of dealing, usage of trade, and course of performance;40 second, to clarify 
that the often sketchy, incomplete written agreements made by merchants are 
not intended to exclude evidence of additional consistent terms unless the parties 
have clearly expressed themselves otherwise.41 These are the points that section 
2-202 addresses. Beyond these points, the section is silent and should be 
supplemented by the common law under section 1-103. 
BATTLE OF THE FORMS 
In Mcjunkin Corp. v. Mechanicals, lnc.,42 the Sixth Circuit applying Ohio 
law, determined that a seller's remedy limitation clause contained in its form did 
not become part of the contract. The buyer was thus able to recover consequen-
tial damages. Mcjunkin Corporation (Buyer) purchased stub ends used to 
connect pipe segments from Alaskan Copper Companies, Inc. (Seller). Buyer 
resold the stub ends to a contractor for use in a pipe system the contractor was 
installing in a chemical plant. After installation, the stub ends proved to be 
defective. Buyer was held liable to the contractor for the extra expenses incurred 
by both the contractor and the plant owner to replace the stub ends. In the 
36. Cf Hibbett Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Biernbaum, 375 So. 2d 431 (Ala. 1979). 
37. 776 S.W.2d 608, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 65 (Tx. Ct. App. 1989). 
38. The court cited several treatises in support of its conclusion. 
39. A.L.I., Uniform Revised Sales Act, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Comment on Section 15 
(4/27/44); reprinted in 2 A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L., U.C.C. Drafts 123-26 (1984). ("Unif. Rev. 
Sales Act, Prop. Final Draft No. 1 "). 
40. U.C.C. § 2-202(a). 
41. u.c.c. § 2-202(b). 
42. 888 F.2d 481, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 712 (6th Cir. 1989). 
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district court, the Buyer was held not entitled to recover from the Seller for two 
reasons: (i) the Seller's remedy limitation clause was held to be part of the 
contract, thus limiting the maximum recovery to replacement cost; (ii) the 
Buyer's failure to permit the Seller to cure was held to constitute a waiver of the 
right to recover replacement cost. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed and 
remanded. 
On the issue of whether the Seller's remedy limitation clause became part of 
the contract, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it did not. The facts relevant to 
this issue were as follows: After discussions between Buyer and Seller, Buyer 
issued a purchase order for the stub ends. The purchase order stated: "[b]y 
acknowledging receipt of this order or by supplying products described herein, 
Seller agrees to the terms and conditions set forth herein." Apparently the 
Buyer also prepaid for the goods. Soon thereafter Seller shipped the first of five 
installments of goods directly to the contractor. With each shipment the Seller 
enclosed a document containing the Seller's remedy limitation clause. This 
clause limited Buyer's remedies to repair, replacement or refund of the purchase 
price at Seller's option, and disclaimed liability for consequential damages. 
Apparently the Seller also sent these documents to the Buyer's head office. Five 
days after the first shipment, Seller sent its acknowledgement form to Buyer. 
This form, in large type, contained both the Seller's remedy limitation clause 
and a clause stating that Seller's acceptance "is expressly conditioned on 
purchaser's assent to" the Seller's standard conditions of sale contained in the 
acknowledgement. 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by rejecting the argument that when it 
shipped the goods the Seller accepted the Buyer's terms. It concluded that the 
more reasonable interpretation of the Seller's conduct was insistence on the 
Seller's terms not assent to the Buyer's terms. Thus the court did not enforce the 
clause in Buyer's purchase order stating that shipment of goods constituted 
acceptance of Buyer's terms. This result accords with the general rules of 
contract formation: by designating what conduct constitutes acceptance, the 
offeror cannot force an offeree who engages in such conduct to accept if the 
offeree does not intend to accept. There is, however a caveat to this rule: if the 
offeror could reasonably infer assent from the offeree's conduct, the offeree must 
notify the offeror that the offeree, by engaging in the conduct, does not intend to 
accept.43 U.C.C. section 2-206(1)(b) is an application of these rules. In Mcjun-
kin the Buyer might have inferred from shipment of the goods that the Seller 
accepted its terms, but the Seller took reasonable steps to notify the Buyer that it 
did not intend to accept, by enclosing its terms with the shipments and sending 
its acknowledgement directly to Buyer. 
The Sixth Circuit then found that Seller's acknowledgement was a "definite 
and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation ... " which 
might have operated as an acceptance under U.C.C. section 2-207(1 ), but did 
43. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 53 Comment b ( 1981 ). 
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not, because the acknowledgement was expressly conditioned upon the buyer's 
assent to the Seller's terms.44 
The court next resolved the question of whether Buyer's failure to object to 
Seller's remedy limitation clause indicated acceptance of that clause. The court 
held not. It cited Dorton v. Collins &- Aikman Corp.45 for the proposition that 
silence without more cannot constitute acceptance of the terms in a competing 
document.46 
The court next proceeded to find that a contract had been formed by mutual 
conduct (Buyer's prepayment and Seller's shipment) under U.C.C. section 
2-207(3). It then held that the Seller's remedy limitation clause was not part of 
the resulting contract. The court reasoned as follows: U.C.C. section 2-207(3) 
states that the terms of the contract "consist of those terms on which the writings 
of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under 
any other provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code]." The court reasoned 
that since the writings of the parties did not agree on the remedy limitation 
clause (Buyer's purchase order apparently was silent on remedies), this clause 
was not part of the contract. In passing, the court noted that, despite a 
"lingering attraction" for the district court's construction, which incorporated 
the Seller's remedy limitation clause as an immaterial alteration not objected to, 
its result was consistent with what the district court had held in companion 
litigation between the Buyer and the contractor. There the district court held a 
remedy limitation clause in the Buyer's form not to be part of the contract 
between Buyer and the contractor for the same reasons that the Sixth Circuit 
held the Seller's remedy limitation clause not to be part of the contract between 
the Buyer and Seller. 
The circuit court's discussion of what terms become part of the contract under 
section 2-207(3) could have gone further. That discussion overlooks the fact that 
section 2-207(2) can be construed to be, in the words of section 2-207(3), an 
"other provision of this Act" that furnishes terms of the contract. 47 
The purpose of section 2-207(2) is to permit reasonable form clauses to 
become part of a contract between merchants unless objected to.48 Such clauses 
44. 888 F.2d at 487; 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 720. 
45. 453 F.2d 1161, 1168 (6th Cir. 1972) and n.4; 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 585, 594, and n.4. 
46. The court did not discuss whether the seller's acknowledgement constituted a counter offer 
which the buyer accepted by taking the goods (the so-called "Last Shot" rule). Probably this 
argument was not raised because of the unusual facts of this case. The Buyer prepaid before the 
Seller shipped; also the goods were shipped to the contractor not the Buyer. Both of these facts 
render this argument nugatory. 
47. Probably this point was neither briefed nor argued to the court. 
48. Note the multiple use of the term "reasonable" in Comments 4 and 5 to section 2-207. See 
also General Comment on Parts II and IV: Formation and Construction, ~ 7. The principle of 
reasonable construction and against surprise at 9-11 ( 1948 ); reprinted in The Karl Llewellyn 
Papers, Section ]: The Uniform Commercial Code, File J(IX)(2)(a) (Wm. S. Hein & Co., Inc. 
microfilm, 1987) ("General Comment"); Unif. Rev. Sales Act, Prop. Final Draft No. 1, supra note 
39, Comment on§ 20, at 129-30. See also 21 A.L.l. Proc. 98 (1944); A.L.I., Minutes of the Revised 
Uniform Sales Act, Conference held at New York City at 31 (Nov. 22-24, 1942) in A.L.I. Archives 
Drawer 182, File: Sales Act, Conference November 22-24, 1942. (Llewellyn speaking: "Both oral 
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cause no surprise or hardship49 if incorporated into the contract, and thus do not 
materially alter the contract under section 2-207(2). How is one to know what 
form clauses are reasonable? We start with trade usage, course of performance, 
and course of dealing.so These are part of the agreement.st Thus, any form 
clause that does not differ materially from these predicates is reasonable. Next, 
the Code "gap-fillers," those terms which article 2 incorporates into a contract 
absent contrary agreement, s2 provide an important guide to what form clauses 
are reasonable. However the Code gap-fillers do not provide the exclusive test of 
reasonableness. There are at least two instances in which a clause might not 
correspond to a Code gap-filler, but still be reasonable. First, the Code may not 
provide any gap-filler on the subject matter of the clause. Most of the Comment 
5 examples of clauses that do not materially alter a contract under section 
2-207(2)(b) are clauses of this type.s3 Second, the circumstances of the case may 
indicate that some other term, not the standard gap-filler is more reasonable. 
The last example in Comment 5 demonstrates this point. In that example a 
clause "limiting remedy in a reasonable manner (see sections 2-718 and 2-719)" 
is said to be a clause that would not materially alter the contract under section 
2-207(2)(b). Yet the standard Code gap-fillers give an injured party a full array 
of remedies, not just liquidated damages or the modified remedies permitted by 
sections 2-718 and 2-719. Thus the example indicates that there are circum-
stances when it is desirable to add reasonable remedy limitations to the contract 
rather than the standard Code remedies. What this essentially means is that the 
deals and wire deals are constantly followed by written confirmations, including additional highly 
reasonable terms. When those terms are highly reasonable and not objected to, the tendency of the 
courts has been to read them right in. I am all for that tendency."); K. Llewellyn, The Common 
Law Tradition 370-71 (1962). 
49. Comment 4 states that whether a clause "materially alter[s]" is to be determined by whether 
surprise or hardship would result if the clause were incorporated without express awareness by the 
other side. An early version of the Comment to what is now section 2-207 elaborated on this 
"surprise or hardship" test. 
Subject therefore to the possibility of surprise by any attempted assertion of what are abnormal 
terms, upsetting rather than supplementing the essential terms dickered about and agreed upon 
any reasonable terms are to be included by silence for more than a reasonable time after 
receipt. Even when overlooked by the receiver, their incorporation imposes no hardship. 
Unif. Rev. Sales Act Prop. Final Draft No. 1, supra note 39, Comment on§ 20, at 129-30. See also 
General Comment supra note 48, at 11 ("Reasonable clauses take no man by surprise ... "); K. 
Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 370 (1962) (referring to "a blanket assent (not a specific 
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms in the form"); Id. at 371 ("The boilerplate is 
assented to en bloc, 'unsight, unseen,' on the implicit assumption and to the full extent that ( 1) it 
does not alter or impair the fair meaning of the dickered terms when read alone, and (2) that its 
terms are neither in the particular nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and unfair."). 
SO. U.C.C. § 1-20S; Id. § 2-208. 
St. U.C.C. § 1-201(3). 
S2. U.C.C. § 2-204 Comment. 
S3. In a purchase for sub-sale, a clause providing for inspection by the sub-purchaser; a clause 
providing for interest on overdue invoices; a clause fixing the seller's standard credit terms. U.C.C. 
§ 2-207 Comment S. 
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circumstances of the case may supply a reasonable term as part of the "agree-
ment."54 
Other arguments support the inclusion of section 2-207 subdivision (2) 
within subdivision (3). There is no reason why reasonable form clauses should 
be part of a contract formed under subdivision ( 1) but not part of a contract 
formed under subdivision (3 ). Indeed, not applying subdivision (2) to contracts 
formed under subdivision (3) can produce absurd situations. The potential for 
absurdity is illustrated by what happened to the seller in Mcjunkin. The seller 
avoided accepting the buyer's offer under subdivision ( 1) by expressly condition-
ing its form. The result was that a contract was formed by mutual conduct 
under subdivision (3) and the buyer automatically received a full array of 
remedies by application of the standard Code remedy gap-fillers. However if the 
seller's form had been drafted so that it operated as an acceptance of the buyer's 
offer under subdivision ( 1 ), then the seller's additional term limiting liability for 
consequential damages might have become part of the contract as a reasonable 
limitation of remedy under subdivision (2). By rejecting the buyer's terms the 
seller lost the chance to add its remedy limitation clause to the ensuing contract, 
a chance which it would have had if it had accepted the buyer's terms. This 
curious situation is not supported by the drafting history. To the contrary, a 
prior draft of section 2-207 explicitly stated that section 2-207, subdivision (2) is 
applicable to contracts formed under subdivision (3).55 Reasonable terms should 
be part of the contract if not objected to, regardless of how the contract is 
formed. 
In sum, when a contract is formed by mutual conduct under section 2-207 
subdivision (3), subdivision (2) should be consulted to determine whether 
additional terms in either form become part of the contract. Consequently, in 
Mcjunkin the better resolution of whether the seller's consequential damages 
54. Cf U.C.C. § 1-201(3) Comment 3 ("Agreement" definition "intended to include full 
recognition of usage of trade, course of dealing, course of performance and the surrounding 
circumstances . ... ")(emphasis added); Id. § 2-308 Comment 4 ("The surrounding circumstances, 
usage of trade, course of dealing and course of performance, as well as the express language of the 
parties, may constitute an 'otherwise agreement.'") (emphasis added); Id. § 2-508 Comment 2 
("Such reasonable grounds can lie in prior course of dealing, course of performance or usage of 
trade as well as in the particular circumstances surrounding the making of the contract.") (emphasis 
added). See also General Comment, supra note 48, at 8 ("The background of circumstances against 
which the agreement is entered into and performed may supply terms not explicitly agreed upon as 
in those instances in which 'reasonableness' is read into time and method of inspection terms (section 
82) or as to facilities to be provided for receiving delivery (section 72).) Id. at 22 (referring to 
standard provision that reasonably limits remedies as meriting a sympathetic and expansive, not 
hostile, application). 
55. A.L.1. and N.C.C.U.S.L., Supplement No. 1 to the 1952 Official Draft of Text and 
Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code§ 2-207(5) [now§ 2-207(3)] at pages 6, 7 (Jan. 1955); 
reprinted in 17 A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L., Uniform Commercial Code Drafts 324-25 (1984) (terms 
consist of "those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary 
terms incorporated under either the next subsection [now§ 2-207(2)] or any other provisions of this 
Act.") (material in brackets added). 
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exclusion clause became part of the contract should turn on whether it was 
reasonable under the circumstances of that case. 
The Study Group appointed by the Permanent Editorial Board to study 
article 2 has concluded that a major revision of section 2-207 is necessary.56 The 
Study Group recommended that the revision proceed along lines suggested by 
Professor John E. Murray, Jr.57 
WARRANTY OF TITLE 
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. Equitable Financial Management, lnc. 58 the Third 
Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law, concluded that a finance lessor is not 
governed by the article 2 warranty of title (section 2-312). In that case the lessee 
(Scalise) purchased equipment that was subject to a pre-existing security 
interest. The lessor (Equitable) financed this purchase, and, as security, it took 
title to the equipment and entered into the lease with Scalise. The lease was 
thus a finance lease.59 In a suit by the previous secured creditor against the 
lessee for damages, the lessee cross-claimed against the lessor for breach of the 
warranty of title under section 2-312. The district court found that the lessor 
had warranted good title because the lease gave the lessee an option to purchase 
the leased goods for one dollar. It concluded, however, that the lessor had not 
breached its warranty of title, because the circumstances should have put the 
lessee on notice of the previous security interest. The Third Circuit affirmed but 
for reasons different than those given below. The Third Circuit first held that 
the lease was intended to create only a security interest, so that it was not 
covered by article 2 generally or by section 2-312.60 It then stated that even if 
the lease were not solely for security, the circumstances of the case gave the 
lessee reason to know that the finance lessor was "selling" only such right or 
title that its supplier might have, so that any warranty of title had been 
effectively disclaimed under subdivision 2-312(b ). 
The case reaches the correct result. Here it is the lessee who has selected the 
goods from the supplier and has instructed the lessor to acquire them. Under 
these circumstances the lessee ought not be able to throw the risk of title 
disputes onto the lessor. The transaction between these parties is either a true 
finance lease or a lease intended as security. If the transaction is a true finance 
56. See Preliminary Report, Permanent Editorial Board of U.C.C. and A.L.I. and 
N.C.C.U.S.L., Article 2 Study Group, Part 2, Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation: 
2-207, Rec. A2.2(8), 20, 21 (Mar. 1, 1990). 
57. Id. Prof. Murray is a member of the Study Group. Other members are: Glenn Arendsen, 
Prof. Amelia Boss, Prof. Steven L. Harris, Prof. Frederick H. Miller, Prof. Charles W. Mooney, 
Jr., Prof. James ]. White, Robert W. Weeks, and Prof. Richard E. Speidel. Prof. Murray's 
suggestions for revision of section 2-207 are contained in Murray, Proposed Revision of Section 
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 J .L. & Com. 337 ( 1986). See also Murray, The Chaos of 
the Battle of the Forms: Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1307 (1986). 
58. 882 F.2d 81, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1 (3d Cir. 1989). 
59. Cf U.C.C. § 2A-103(1)(g) and Comment g. 
60. u.c.c. § 2-102. 
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lease, the lessor is a finance lessor and makes no warranty of title.61 If the 
transaction is a lease intended as security-because the lessee has the option to 
become the owner of the goods for a nominal consideration (one dollar )-then 
the lessor's interest in the goods is not title, but a security interest,62 and the 
lessee has title. The transaction is then, in effect, a cash sale of the goods by the 
supplier to the lessee with the lessor furnishing the cash on the lessee's behalf 
and taking a security interest in the goods to secure repayment of the cash 
advance. The supplier, not the lessor, is the seller, and it is the supplier, not the 
lessor, who warrants title under section 2-312. 
EXPRESS WARRANTY 
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, lnc.,63 the Third Circuit, applying New 
Jersey law, considered several issues pertaining to the creation and enforcement 
of article 2 express warranties. Plaintiff sued defendant cigarette manufacturer 
for the death from lung cancer of his wife who had smoked defendant's 
cigarettes for much of the time between 1942 and her death in 1984. The 
plaintiff contended, among other theories, that the manufacturer made express 
warranties about the safety of its products entitling him to recover for breach of 
express warranty under article 2. The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff 
on this theory. On appeal the manufacturer raised ~everal arguments about its 
liability for breach of express warranty. First, it contended that it made no 
affirmations of fact that could have become express warranties under U.C.C. 
section 2-313(1)(a). Second, the manufacturer argued that even if it had made 
such representations, they did not become part of the basis of the bargain as 
required by that section. Third, the manufacturer maintained that the plaintiff's 
wife's comparative fault in smoking cigarettes after acquiring knowledge of 
their harmful effects should have reduced plaintiff's recovery for breach of 
warranty. Finally, it contended that the conduct of plaintiff's wife in smoking 
cigarettes while knowing they were harmful precluded defendant's breach of 
warranty from being the proximate cause of her injuries under U.C.C. section 
2-715. 
Although the manufacturer did not directly sell cigarettes to the plaintiff's 
wife, the court ruled that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude 
that the manufacturer represented to consumers that the long-term smoking of 
its cigarettes would not endanger their health. The court cited several of the 
manufacturer's advertisements which stated that cigarette smoking was safe. 
The court found it reasonable to infer that an unqualified representation that 
smoking is safe creates a warranty that smoking for a long period of time is safe. 
The court's ruling on this issue appears consistent with decisions in other cases 
61. Cf U.C.C. § 2A-211(2). 
62. u.c.c. § 1-201(37). 
63. 893 F.2d 541, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 625 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 59 U.S.L.W. 
3648, 3652 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1991) (No. 90-1038) (Court to consider whether Federal Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertising Act preempts state tort claims against cigarette manufacturers). 
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finding broad assertions of safety to constitute express warranties.64 A seller's 
representation that a product is safe may be treated as a mere representation of 
the seller's opinion and not a warranty where the seller does not have any 
special knowledge not possessed by the buyer about the goods.65 However in this 
case during the time the manufacturer promoted the advertisements, the 1950s 
through the 1960s, it may have had, and through its advertising may have 
purported to have had, superior information on the health effects of smoking its 
cigarettes. Moreover, the manufacturer's advertisements claimed to be based on 
extensive medical testing and appeared to be designed to overcome consumer 
concerns about its product's safety. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable 
for the trier of fact to construe a representation of safety as a warranty and not 
merely as the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods. 
The manufacturer next contended that the advertisements, even if affirma-
tions of fact, did not become part of the basis of the bargain as required by 
U.C.C. section 2-313(1)(a), because Mrs. Cipollone did not rely on those 
advertisements. Whether a buyer must rely upon an affirmation of fact for it to 
be part of the basis of the bargain has been the subject of considerable debate 
among courts and commentators. 66 In Cipollone the trial court instructed the 
jury that an affirmation becomes part of the basis of the bargain "if it would 
naturally induce the purchase of the product and no particular reliance by the 
buyer on such statement needs to be shown."67 
The Third Circuit found this charge to be error, primarily because it did not 
require the plaintiff to prove that the buyer Mrs. Cipollone was ever aware of 
the affirmation.68 It also disapproved the charge because it was inconsistent with 
the Official Comments to U.C.C. section 2-313: two of those comments envisage 
a mechanism for overcoming the presumption that the seller's affirmations, even 
if heard by the buyer, are a basis of the bargain. The jury charge provided no 
such mechanism. The court also rejected the manufacturer's presumption of 
reliance theory. Under that theory reliance is presumed if the affirmation would 
reasonably induce the purchase, but the seller can rebut this presumption by 
proving that the buyer did not rely on the affirmation. The court rejected this 
theory for the reason that it put a heavy burden on the buyer to give evidence of 
reliance. The court concluded that this burden was inconsistent with the U.C.C. 
as a whole and several comments to U.C.C. section 2-313.69 
The Third Circuit developed a three-step test that deemphasized reliance, yet 
required that the buyer be aware of the affirmation: first, the buyer must prove 
64. See Drayton v. Jiffe Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 26 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 865 (6th Cir. 1978); 
Hauter v. Zogarts, 14 Cal. 3d 104, 534 P.2d 377, 120 Cal. Rptr. 68, 16 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938 
(1975). 
65. See Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 9 Ill. App. 3d 906, 293 N.E.2d 375, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
429 (1973); accord Royal Business Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44, 30 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 462 (7th Cir. 1980). 
66. See B. Clark & C. Smith, The Law of Product Warranties 4-27-4-36 (1984). 
67. 893 F.2d at 563, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 642. 
68. 893 F.2d at 569, to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 650. 
69. 893 F.2d at 567, to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 647-48. 
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that it was aware of the affirmation.70 Proof of buyer awareness of the affirma-
tion creates a rebuttable presumption that the affirmation is part of the basis of 
the bargain. Second, the seller can rebut this presumption by proving that the 
buyer knew the affirmation to be untrue.71 This step, the court believed to be 
required by the Official Comments, traditional contract principles, and New 
Jersey caselaw. Third, if the seller does prove that the buyer knew the 
affirmation to be false, the buyer can still prove that it relied upon the 
affirmation to establish a warranty:72 "It is possible to disbelieve, but still rely 
on, the existence of a warranty. In this sense the buyer can 'buy' a lawsuit."73 
The Third Circuit thus adopted a test requiring that the buyer be aware of 
the affirmation or promise in order for it to be an express warranty. This is 
clearly what is contemplated by the comments to U.C.C. section 2-313. Those 
comments variously describe statements that become express warranties as those 
that "rest on 'dickered' aspects of the bargain";74 or that are "part of a 
negotiation which ends in a contract."75 Even the comment which states that 
postsale affirmations can be express warranties contemplates the buyer being 
aware of the affirmations: "[i]f language is used after the closing of the deal (as 
when the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional assur-
ance) .... "76 Finally use of the word "bargain" throughout the text and 
comments of U.C.C. section 2-313 supports a requirement that the buyer be 
aware of the affirmations. 
The court of appeals also considered the relevance of Mrs. Cipollone's 
knowledge of the hazards of smoking cigarettes with respect to two other U.C.C. 
issues. The first was whether Mrs. Cipollone's knowledge warranted an in-
struction that she was comparatively at fault, thereby reducing Liggett's liability 
for breach of express warranty. Citing New Jersey decisions allowing compara-
tive fault to limit or bar recovery for breach of an implied warranty,77 the court 
stated in dictum that the maker of an express warranty could invoke compara-
tive fault as a defense if it could show that a buyer misused or abused a product 
or used the product after learning the warranty was false. The court stated, 
however, that for the defense to have been available in Cipollone, it would have 
been necessary for the manufacturer to have established that Mrs. Cipollone 
purchased cigarettes while still believing manufacturer's express warranties, 
smoked cigarettes after learning that the representations were false, and then 
contracted cancer from those specific cigarettes. Determining that no reasonable 
jury could make such a finding, the court concluded that comparative fault was 
not a defense. 
70. 893 F.2d at 567, JO U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 648-49. 
71. 893 F.2d at 568, JO U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 649. 
72. 893 F.2d at 568 n.31, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 649 n.31. 
73. 893 F.2d at 568 n.31, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 649 n.31. 
74. U.C.C. § 2-313 Comment 1. 
75. Id. Comment 3. 
76. Id. Comment 7. 
77. See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); 
Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965). 
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Mrs. Cipollone's knowledge of the falsity of the manufacturer's affirmations 
raised the final question whether such knowledge precluded her injury from 
being the proximate result of Liggett's breach of warranty as required by 
U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(b). Comment 5 to that section indicates that if a buyer 
discovers a defect in goods prior to its use of the product, any injury resulting 
from the defect would not proximately result from the breach of warranty. In 
such a situation, it would not be reasonable to foresee that a buyer, having 
learned of the defect and risk of injury, would continue to use the product. 
Moreover, allowing a buyer to recover consequential damages once it learned of 
the breach would be inconsistent with the general contract principle of mitiga-
tion of damages. Consistently with its ruling on the defense of comparative fault, 
the court of appeals ruled that evidence of Mrs. Cipollone's knowledge of the 
falsity of the manufacturer's affirmations concerning the safety of its cigarettes 
was irrelevant to the causation issue under U.C.C. section 2-715 since, on the 
facts of this case, her knowledge that the representations were false would have 
precluded the affirmations from being part of the basis of the bargain and thus 
not warranties in the first place. 
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE 
Courts continue to differ on whether an ordinary purpose of goods under 
U.C.C. section 2-314 (merchantability warranty) can be a particular purpose 
under U.C.C. section 2-315 (warranty of fitness for particular purpose). 
In Lorfano v. Dura Stone Steps, lnc.,78 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court 
said no. In that case the court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the seller of prefabricated concrete steps. The plaintiff, an employee of the 
buyer, was injured when he fell from the side of the steps. His suit against the 
seller was based on the fact that no handrail had been installed. He alleged this 
failure to be a breach of the warranties of merchantability and fitness for 
particular purpose. Apparently the seller had offered to sell handrails to the 
buyer who had declined to purchase them. The warranty of fitness for particu-
lar purpose does not arise unless the buyer relies on the seller to select suitable 
goods.79 In this case, the buyer obviously did not rely on the seller in not 
purchasing handrails. Thus, on these facts the court reached the proper conclu-
sion that there could be no warranty of fitness for particular purchase. 
In Great Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc.,80 the Arkansas 
Supreme Court, in effect, held that an ordinary purpose could be a particular 
purpose and so create an implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose. In 
that case the buyer (Malvern Pulpwood) purchased two pulpwood trailers from 
the seller-manufacturer (Great Dane) to be used for hauling pulpwood. Within 
a year both trailers broke in the same spot. Replacement trailers also broke in 
78. 569 A.2d 195, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 39 (Me. 1990). 
79. u.c.c. § 2-315. . 
80. 301 Ark. 436, 785 S.W.2d 13, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 875 (1990). 
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the same spot. The buyer then sued for breach of the warranties of 
merchantability and fitness for particular purpose. The seller defended on the 
ground of a "repair or replacement" warranty and disclaimer. The jury 
returned a verdict for the buyer only on the fitness warranty, as it was not 
instructed on the warranty of merchantability.81 On appeal, the supreme court 
affirmed. It ruled that the trial court had correctly denied the seller's motion for 
summary judgment so that the case had properly been submitted to the jury. In 
arguing that its summary judgment motion should have been granted, the seller 
maintained that the warranty of fitness could arise only where the buyer had a 
particular purpose other than an ordinary purpose of the goods. The court 
rejected this argument, citing a federal district court case82 and U.C.C. section 
2-317 which, the court said, provides that warranties shall be construed as 
cumulative with each other. 
These cases reflect the substantial split of authority on the question of 
whether an ordinary purpose of goods can be a particular purpose and so give 
rise to a warranty of fitness for that particular purpose under U.C.C. section 
2-315.83 
EXCLUSION OR MODIFICATION OF WARRANTIES 
In two cases this year courts found written disclaimers of the warranty of 
merchantability to be effective under U.C.C. section 2-316(2) even though the 
disclaimers did not mention merchantability as that subsection requires. The 
first case is Dairyland Insurance Co. v. General Motors Corp.84 decided by the 
Alabama Supreme Court. In that case the buyer purchased a new van from a 
Chevrolet dealer and quickly experienced trouble with the electrical system. 
Some eight months later the van burned, apparently as a result of a short in the 
electrical system. The buyer sued both the manufacturer and the dealer on a 
variety of theories including breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for both the manufacturer and 
dealer on all counts. 
On appeal the Alabama Supreme Court reversed as to the buyer's warranty 
claims and one of its tort claims. On rehearing, the court modified its earlier 
opinion by affirming the trial court's dismissal of the warranty claims against 
the dealer. The court based its modified opinion upon a warranty disclaimer 
clause appearing in the sale contract which the court held to be effective to 
disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability. 
On this point, the court's opinion rests on a puzzling application of U.C.C. 
section 2-316(2). The court quoted the language of subdivision 2-316(2) which 
81. 301 Ark. at 443, 785 S.W.2d at 17, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 879. 
82. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Flexible Tubing Corp., 270 F. Supp. 548 (D. Conn. 1967). 
83. See B. Clark & C. Smith, The Law of Product Warranties 'II 6.02[2] nn.26, 27 (1984); cases 
are collected in Annotation, Uniform Commercial Code: Implied Warranty of Fitness for Particular 
Purpose As Including Fitness for Ordinary Use, 83 A.L.R. 3d 656 (1978). 
84. 549 So. 2d 44, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 903 (Ala. 1989}. 
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requires that disclaimers of the implied warranty of merchantability be conspic-
uous and mention the word merchantability. Noting that the disclaimer lan-
guage was in bold print, the court quoted the exact language of the disclaimer.85 
That language did not use the word merchantability. Nevertheless the court 
held the disclaimer to be effective. The court stated that the disclaimer was 
similar to one it had previously held to be effective in Wilburn v. Larry Savage 
Chevrolet, Inc. 86 In fact, the disclaimer held to be effective in Wilburn did 
mention the word merchantability.87 Thus, the court's quotation of subdivision 
2-316(2) is puzzling. 
On closer reading, however, it is clear that the court's decision probably rests 
on the provisions of U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(a). If the disclaimer does not 
mention merchantability, there is no authority under U.C.C. section 2-316(2) 
for finding such a disclaimer to be effective to disclaim the implied warranty of 
merchantability. The only alternative would be for the court to base its decision 
on the provisions of subdivision 2-316(3)(a), which provides that all implied 
warranties may be disclaimed by "language which in common understanding 
calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that 
there is no implied warranty." The Dairyland court, in fact, cites two other 
cases that do rely on subdivision 2-316(3)(a).88 Unfortunately, these cases are 
cited without comment, except to suggest that they support the holding of the 
Wilburn case. 
Although the court could have based its decision in Dairyland on subdivision 
2-316(3)(a), it is not clear that doing so is justified under the facts of the case. 
Dairyland involved the sale of a new van that burned within eight months of 
purchase. Subdivision 2-316(3)(a) states that general language of disclaimer is 
not effective if "the circumstances indicate otherwise."89 It may be that the 
circumstances of the case at least raise a question of fact which should have been 
sufficient to defeat the Chevrolet dealer's summary judgment motion. 
In Travel Craft, Inc. v. Wilhelm Mende GmbH b Co. 90 the Indiana 
Supreme Court held disclaimer language drafted by the buyer and which did 
not mention merchantability to be effective to disclaim the implied warranty of 
85. The language of the disclaimer was: 
Warranties Seller Disclaims. You understand that the Seller is not offering any warranties and 
there are no particular purpose, or any other warranties, express or implied by the Seller, 
covering the vehicle unless the Seller extends a written warranty or service contract within 90 
days from the date of this contract. 549 So. 2d at 48, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 907. 
86. 477 So. 2d 384 (Ala. 1985). 
87. Id. at 386. 
88. The two cases are: Gaylord v. Lawler Homes, Inc., 477 So. 2d 382, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
131(Ala.1985); Gilliam v. Indiana National Bank, 337 So. 2d 352, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 307 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1976). 
89. For a discussion of the drafting history of "the circumstances indicate otherwise" phrase of 
U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(a), see Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and 
Documents of Title, 44 Bus. Law. 1445, 1459 n.70 (1989). 
90. 552 N.E.2d 443, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1141 (Ind. 1990). 
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merchantability. The case is a good example of proper interpretation of the 
Code. Comment 1 to U.C.C. section 1-102 states, "[t]he text of each section 
should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in 
question .... "91 The court identified the purpose of requiring a disclaimer to 
mention merchantability to be "to protect a buyer from unexpected and unbar-
gained language of disclaimer .... "92 The court concluded. that where, as here, 
the buyer drafts the disclaimer clause, this purpose is satisfied and the dis-
claimer is effective. Where the reason for the rule stops, there stops the rule. 
Trans-Aire International, Inc. v. Northern Adhesive Co., /nc.93 decided by 
the Seventh Circuit and applying Illinois law is a good illustration of the 
application of U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(b) under which an examination of the 
goods by the buyer prior to contracting can result in the exclusion of implied 
warranties. In that case the buyer (Trans-Aire) contacted the seller (Northern) 
regarding the purchase of adhesive to be used in installing fabric in recreational 
vehicles. Buyer was interested in obtaining a substitute for another adhesive that 
had failed to adhere in hot climates. After being informed of the purpose for 
which buyer needed the adhesive, seller sent several samples to buyer "for 
experimentation purposes."94 Successful tests were conducted in a cool plant, 
leading buyer's chief engineer, Fribley, to conclude that seller's Adhesive 7448 
was superior to the adhesive previously used. Fribley's uncontradicted testimony 
was that he informed buyer's president that additional tests should be conducted 
in a heated environment. Nevertheless buyer's president stated that he was 
satisfied with the product, and an order was placed. Seller's adhesive also failed 
to adhere in hot climates, and buyer sued for, among other things, breach of the 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 
The trial court granted seller's motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that the implied warranties had been excluded by buyer's examination and 
testing of the samples. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying on U.C.C. section 
2-316(3)(b) and its comments.95 Quoting Official Comment 8, the court held 
that, "[a] professional buyer examining a product in his field will be held to 
have assumed the risk as to all defects which a professional in the field ought to 
observe." Even though tests conducted in a cool environment did not reveal 
defects in the adhesive, buyer was aware of the problems encountered with a 
similar adhesive in hot climates. There was no proof by buyer that heat testing 
could not be performed. Seller, on the other hand, suggested that heat testing 
could easily be accomplished by placing a sample in an oven or by sending a 
sample to an independent laboratory. Thus the buyer's testing was held to 
91. U.C.C. § 1-201 Comment 1. 
92. Id.§ 2-316 Comment 1. 
93. 882 F.2d 1254, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 878 (7th Cir. 1989). 
94. 882 F.2d at 1256, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 880. 
95. U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(b) provides in pertinent part "when the buyer before entering into 
the contract has examined the goods ... as fully as he desired ... there is no implied warranty with 
regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him .... " 
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negate any implied warranty that the adhesive would perform satisfactorily in 
hot climates. 
U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(b) places a heavy burden on the buyer who under-
takes to examine goods or samples prior to contracting. A buyer who does so 
would be well advised to obtain express warranties from the seller. 
TITLE, CREDITORS, AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS 
In years past, conflict between U.C.C. section 2-403 and certificate of title 
laws has often appeared as an issue. This year, the cases that involve certificate 
of title laws do so only peripherally and generally rely on U.C.C. section 2-403 
as the primary rule of decision. In Suburban Motors, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.,96 a case of first impression, a California court 
reached the rather unremarkable conclusion that a good faith purchaser of an 
automobile cannot acquire good title where the chain of conveyances includes a 
theft, despite the facial validity of the certificate of title.97 The court noted that, 
according to the terms of U.C.C. section 2-403, the transfer of title is effectuated 
only through a voluntary transaction of purchase. A transfer by theft is neither 
voluntary nor a transaction of purchase. The thief acquires no title and thus can 
convey none; even the good faith purchaser status of a subsequent transferee 
cannot cure this deficiency. Moreover, the "full title" doctrine, which was urged 
upon the court by the innocent transferee, is not applicable to a transfer which is 
tainted by a previous theft. This doctrine, permitting exclusive reliance upon a 
valid certificate of title, operates only to defeat unlisted security interests. In this 
case, the plaintiff is the insurance company of the original owner claiming 
ownership of the vehicle, not merely a security interest. The court noted the 
impossibility of the insurance company protecting its interests by "giving notice 
to good faith purchasers who ... take under a spurious chain of title dependent 
on 'laundered' title documents."98 
In a case of apparent first impression, an Illinois court determined that for 
purposes of U.C.C. section 2-403(2),99 a mistaken transfer of goods to a 
merchant dealing in goods of that kind does not constitute an entrustment. In 
Kahr v. Markland, too plaintiff transferor donated some bags of what he thought 
contained only used clothing to a Goodwill store. In reality, one of the sacks 
contained valuables not intended for donation, including 28 pieces of sterling 
96. 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
97. The clean California certificate was based on a certificate of title from Louisiana. The court 
speculates that the Louisiana certificate came from a previously damaged vehicle registered in 
Louisiana which was falsely represented to authorities in that state as "rebuilt." Id. at 58n.1. 
98. Id. at 63. Also decided this survey period was Robinson v. Durham, 537 So. 2d 966, 9 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 563 (Ala. Cir. App. 1988), which dealt with facts almost identical to those in 
Suburban Motors. As in Suburban Motors, the court in Robinson ruled that good title cannot be 
acquired by even a good faith purchaser once a theft has tainted the chain of conveyances. 
99. U.C.C. section 2-403(2) provides that "(a)ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant 
who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in 
ordinary course of business." 
100. 187 Ill. App. 3d 603, 543 N.E.2d 579, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 355 (1989). 
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silver. Shortly after receiving the silver, Goodwill sold it to defendant for 
$15.00. 
Appealing from a judgment awarding the silver to plaintiff, defendant con-
tended that she was entitled to protection under U.C.C. section 2-403(2). The 
appellate court ruled that this provision did not apply because the silver was not 
entrusted to Goodwill. The court relied on the Illinois commentary accompany-
ing U.C.C. section 2-403(3 ), which states that entrusting "includes any volun-
tary transfer of possession by ... the entrustor."101 The court ruled that the 
transfer of the silver to Goodwill was not a voluntary transfer since plaintiff 
unknowingly transferred the silver to Goodwill. Having decided that defendant 
was not protected by U.C.C. section 2-403, the court found that the silver was 
lost property subject to recovery by owners. 
As acknowledged in the concurring opinion of Justice Lund, a strong argu-
ment can be made that the description of entrusting under U.C.C. section 2-403 
should include the mistaken delivery of goods. As between a buyer in the 
ordinary course of business, who by definition must be ignorant of the fact that 
his purchase violates the ownership rights of the transferor, and the mistaken 
transferor, the latter appears to be in a superior position to protect against the 
mistaken transfer of the goods through the exercise of reasonable care. 
Although not dispositive in the Kahr case, defendant's lack of good faith could 
arguably have been made the basis of the ruling favoring plaintiff, since the 
defendant testified that she knew at the time of purchase that the silverware was 
not stainless steel. According to the definition found in U.C.C. section 1-201(9), 
good faith is a necessary attribute of anyone hoping to qualify as a buyer in 
ordinary course.102 
The buyer's good faith played a greater role in Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. 
Holt. 103 In Barco, plaintiff purchased an automobile from Exotic Car Leasing 
Corp., then leased the vehicle back to Exotic. Sometime thereafter, Exotic sold 
the car to defendant. Plaintiff sued for conversion and its motion for summary 
judgment was granted in the lower court. 104 The court of appeals reversed, 
holding that under u.c.c. section 2-403(2), defendant received a valid title as 
long as he qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course. Because the record contained 
insufficient evidence on the question of the buyer's good faith, this issl!e 
presented a question of fact making summary judgment improper. 105 
101. Ill. Ann. Stat. 26-2-403(3), Illinois Code Comment 331(Smith-Hurd1963). 
102. A buyer in ordinary course of business is defined as "a person who in good faith and 
without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a 
third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that 
kind .... " U.C.C. § 1-201(9). 
103. 228 N.J. Super. 77, 548 A.2d 1161, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 111 (1988). 
104. The trial court based its decision on common law principles of conversion without 
considering what impact the Code might have on the superiority of the plaintiff's present right of 
possession. 
105. The defendant never received the title documents until sometime after the sale, and then 
under circumstances raising questions about their validity. The court does state that one can be a 
buyer in ordinary course even if a certificate of title is never acquired. Other jurisdictions support 
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CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Flo-Lizer, Inc. (In re Flo-Lizer, Inc.)"106 highlights the 
willingness of some courts to look beyond the label which the parties attach to a 
particular transaction in order to discern its true nature.107 In that case, CIBA-
Geigy, the manufacturer of an herbicide, nominally sold its product to its 
distributor, Kova, Inc., but indicated on the bills of lading that the product was 
to be delivered to CIBA-Geigy and warehoused at Flo-Lizer. After Flo-Lizer 
filed for bankruptcy, CIBA-Geigy initiated an adversary proceeding seeking a 
judgment that the herbicide was not property of the bankruptcy estate. 108 
Evaluating the facts and circumstances of the relationship, the court found 
that a sale or return, not a warehousing venture, was intended. Particularly 
revealing was the fact that the quantity of herbicide delivered to Flo-Lizer was 
based not on the storage needs of CIBA-Geigy, but on the sales capabilities of 
Flo-Lizer. The court also found it relevant that the arrangement was instigated 
by CIBA-Geigy and that Flo-Lizer was to receive compensation beyond the 
"storage" period. 
Having identified the relationship as a "sale or return,'' the court applied 
section 2-326(3)109 to determine that CIBA-Geigy would not be entitled to 
protection from the claims of Flo-Lizer's creditors. Because CIBA-Geigy had 
delivered goods to a business dealing "in goods of the kind ... , under a name 
other than the name of the person making delivery ,"110 its failure to comply 
with any of three alternatives offered by the provision for protecting a con-
signor's interests left the herbicide available for satisfaction of Flo-Lizer's 
creditors' claims.111 
this view. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 
45 Bus. Law. 2289, 2307 ( 1990). However, the court indicates an unwillingness to recognize the 
plaintiff's interest unless it can produce a certificate of title in compliance with Florida law. See 
F.S.A. § 319.22(1) ("no court shall recognize the right, title, claim, or interest of any person in or to 
any motor vehicle or mobile home sold, disposed of, mortgaged, or encumbered, unless evidenced by 
a certificate of title duly issued to that person .... "). 
106. 100 Bankr. 341, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 765 (S.D. Ohio 1989). 
107. For a case decided this survey period in which the court seemingly deferred to the parties' 
characterization of the transaction, see Beverage Products Corp. v. Robinson, 27 Ark. App. 225, 769 
S.W.2d 424, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 565 (1989) (the court accepted documentary recitation that the 
arrangement was a "loan"). 
108. Technically, the issue presented for resolution was whether the herbicide was property of 
the estate, not whether it would be available to satisfy third-party claims. These are two distinct 
issues, yet the court seems to assume that the status of property as part of the debtor's estate is 
implicit in the finding of a sale or return relationship. More accurately, the failure of CIBA-Geigy 
to protect its interest under U.C.C. section 2-326(3) presumably permitted the avoidance of that 
interest under 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West 1979). 
109. The court's characterization of the transaction as a "sale or return" was probably intended 
to mean only that the delivery of the herbicide is "deemed to be on sale or return .... " U.C.C. 
§ 2-326(3) (emphasis added). 
110. Id. 
111. In another case decided this reporting period, In re Sullivan, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 552 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989), a consignor's property was held to be protected because it had complied 
with U.C.C. section 2-326(3) by erecting a sign identifying the property as its own. The usefulness 
of this alternative is severely limited by the fact that only two states, Mississippi and North Carolina 
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The most interesting aspect of the case is the court's determination that actual 
authority to sell is not necessary for the relationship to qualify as a sale or 
return. According to the court, the "for sale" element 112 is satisfied if it can be 
shown that the one to whom the goods were delivered had the apparent power 
to sell. Notice that this interpretation of U.C.C. section 2-326(3) creates in 
effect a creditors' version of U.C.C. section 2-403(2). Whether this reading of 
U.C.C. section 2-326(3) is preferable as a matter of policy will depend in large 
measure on the extent to which creditors rely on their debtors' possession of 
specific assets. Recent scholarship strongly suggests that their reliance is far less 
than was previously believed. 113 
RISKOF LOSS 
Sellers wishing to obtain a backdoor pnonty if their buyers end up in 
bankruptcy should consider the holding in Crysen/ Montenay Energy Co. v. 
Esselen Associates Inc. (In re Crysen/ Montenay Energy Co.). 114 In 1985, 
Crysen agreed to supply fuel oil to Consolidated Edison company of New York, 
Inc. ("Con Edison"). To determine the quantity of oil delivered in a given 
shipment, an independent inspector would gauge the amount of oil received in 
Con Edison's shore tanks. In the absence of these measurements, the contract 
provided for the substitution of vessel discharge figures. In 1986, Crysen agreed 
to purchase fuel oil from Esselen. Because Crysen intended to resell the oil 
purchased from Esselen to Con Edison, it directed Esselen to deliver directly to 
Con Edison's terminal in New York harbor. 
Controversy arose when the independent inspector found on one oecasion that 
Esselen's vessel discharged 113,255.93 barrels of oil at Con Edison's terminal, 
but that only 99,719.02 barrels found their way into Con Edison's shore tanks. 
Accordingly, Con Edison paid Crysen the price for only 99,719.02 barrels and 
Crysen in turn paid the same to Esselen. In February 1986, Esselen sued 
Crysen to recover the purchase price of the "missing barrels." This suit was 
later dismissed in June of that same year when Crysen filed for bankruptcy. In 
1987, Esselen filed suit against Con Edison, alleging that it had converted or 
misappropriated the lost barrels. Crysen sought to enjoin that action, claiming 
have sign laws. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-3-7 (1972 & 1989 Cum. Supp.); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§§ 66-72 (1975). 
The recommendation of the Article 2 Study Group is that U.C.C. section 2-326(3) be rewritten to 
make compliance with article 9 filing requirements the only alternative available to consignors 
wishing to protect their property from the claims of the consignee's creditors. See Preliminary 
Report, Rec. A.2.3(18)(B)(I). 
112. U.C.C. section 2-326(3) begins with the requirement that the goods must be "delivered to a 
person for sale .... " 
113. See Mooney, The Mystery and Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A 
Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 Ala. Rev. 683 (1988). 
114. 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 881 (2d Cir. 1990). 
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that the tort action against Con Edison was the exclusive property of the 
bankruptcy estate.115 The bankruptcy court agreed; the district court disagreed. 
The Second Circuit sided with the bankruptcy court. Whether the tort action 
was the exclusive property of Crysen's estate depended upon Esselen's right to 
sue under U.C.C. section 2-722. 116 After dealing with the issues of whether 
Esselen has either title,117 a security interest,118 an insurable interest119 or risk of 
loss under U.C.C. section 2-509120 with regard to the missing oil and determin-
ing that it did not, the court turned to Esselen's argument that it "has since the 
injury assumed the risk [of loss] as against the other."121 The court found 
nothing in the record to suggest that Esselen had given up any claim it might 
have against Crysen. While acknowledging that Esselen's suit against Crysen 
had been dismissed, the court noted that it was dismissed without prejudice. 
Finally, declining to decide the case on the basis of section 2-722 alone, the 
Second Circuit observed that if Esselen were permitted to sue, principles of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata would require that it also sue on behalf of 
Crysen 122-something not permitted because of the reorganization aspect of the 
controversy. 
The decision in Crysen represents a very broad reading of U.C.C. section 
2-722. Under the decision, a seller would seem to have the statutory right to 
115. 11 U.S.C.A. section 362(a)(3) (West 1979 & Supp. 1991) automatically stays "any act to 
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property frorri the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate .... " 11 U.S.C.A. section 541(a)(1) defines property of a debtor's estate as 
including "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the 
case." Whether something qualifies as property of the estate will depend, at least in part, on the 
debtors' rights with respect to the property under state law. See, e.g., In re Howard's Appliance 
Corp., 874 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1989). 
116. U.C.C. section 2-722 provides in pertinent part: 
Where a third party so deals with goods which have been identified to a contract for sale as 
to cause actionable injury to a party to that contract 
(a) a right <;>faction against the third party is. in either party to the contract for sale who 
has title to or a security interest or a special property or an insurable interest in the 
goods; and if the goods have been destroyed or converted a right of action is also in the 
party who either bore the risk of loss under the contract for sale or has since the injury 
assumed that risk as against the other .... 
117. Because Esselen delivered the fuel oil to the designated site, title had passed to Crysen 
under U.C.C. section 3-401. 
118. Esselen did not have a security interest in the oil because there had been no compliance 
with the applicable provisions of article 9. 
119. The moment title passed to Crysen, Esselen lost its special property interest and no longer 
had an insurable interest. See U.C.C. § 2-501. 
120. Once the oil was delivered to Con Edison's terminal, the risk of loss passed to Crysen under 
U.C.C. section 2-509(1)(b). 
121. U.C.C. § 2-722(a). 
122. The court fails to mention precisely which principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata 
would work to Crysen's prejudice. It is basic hornbook law that only persons who were parties or 
who are in privily with parties are bound by res judicata or collateral estoppel. See generally 18 C. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction§§ 4448-62 (1981). 
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proceed directly against a sub-purchaser provided proper steps were taken to 
release its claim against the immediate purchaser. 123 
It could be argued that if the oil was indeed lost after delivery to Con Edison, 
then the section should be inapplicable regardless of whether the actions of Con 
Edison were tortious. As between Esselen and Crysen, there simply would be no 
risk for Esselen to assume-the risk of loss would be borne by Con Edison. 124 
To hold otherwise is to turn U.C.C. section 2-722 into a vehicle for providing 
additional security to sellers.125 Presumably, it was drafted with a quite differ-
ent function in mind. 
TENDER, CURE, AND NOTICE 
As the cases considering U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a) continue to accumulate, 
the jurisprudence surrounding this section has taken on a complexity which few 
other sections in article 2 can rival. Not only does one encounter the inevitable 
slew of cases wrestling with the amorphous requirement that notice must be 
given "within a reasonable time";126 one also sees the nonuniform recognition of 
a growing number of distinctions built upon party identity and the nature of the 
claim. 
In Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C, &- S, lnc.,127 the Supreme 
Court of Illinois was faced with a multi-count complaint filed against various 
defendants who were in some way involved with the distribution of asbestos-
containing material. 128 Conceding that no formal notice was given, the plaintiffs 
argued that their litigation filing served as adequate notification. 129 While the 
court agreed that in an appropriate case the filing of a complaint could satisfy 
123. By not deciding in the first instance whether Con Edison bore the risk of loss at the time the 
oil disappeared, the opinion leaves the impression that it does not matter. Yet, if the risk had already 
passed to Con Edison then its behavior toward the oil would be irrelevant (it would owe the 
purchase price regardless of any wrongdoing). If that is so, logic suggests that Con Edison's behavior 
is also irrelevant for purposes of Esselen's claim under U.C.C. section 2-722. In a footnote the court 
does mention that title and the risk of loss may not have passed to Con Edison, but it does so for the 
limited purpose of pointing out that Crysen may also have a claim under U.C.C. section 2-722. 11 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 887 n.1. 
124. Esselen would have an action for the price against Crysen, and Crysen would, in turn, have 
an action for the price against Con Edison. The application of U.C.C. section 2-722 only makes 
sense if Con Edison is not otherwise obligated to pay for the oil. 
125. If allowed to recover the purchase price directly from Con Edison, Esselen would escape 
the effects of Crysen's bankruptcy and Crysen's other creditors would be deprived of the full 
purchase price owed by Con Edison. 
126. U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a) requires that "[t]he buyer must within a reasonable time after 
he discovers or should have discovered any breach, notify the seller of breach or be barred from any 
remedy." 
127. 131 Ill. 2d 428, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 90 (1989). 
128. For a discussion of the court's disposition of other issues, including the several tort-based 
theories of recovery advanced by plaintiffs, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
129. Curiously, the court does not respond to the plaintiffs' contention that notice was also 
supplied by a previously filed (1983) class action suit on behalf of all U.S. elementary and secondary 
schools against virtually all of the present defendants. 
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the statute it held that this was not such a case. The distinction drawn was that 
here, no personal injuries were alleged and the plaintiffs were a body politic and 
not consumers.°0 
Compare Chemtrol Adhesives, Inc. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Ins. 
Co. 131 Before the Supreme Court of Ohio was a breach of warranty claim filed 
by the subrogee (Lexington Insurance Company) of the buyer, Chemical 
Adhesives, Inc. ("Chemical"). Both the trial court and the court of appeals 
adopted what might be referred to as a strict standard of notice, requiring that 
the notice must indicate that the transaction is "claimed to involve a breach."132 
Hence, both courts agreed that the subrogee's claim was barred as a matter of 
law where the only evidence of notice consisted of allegations that the seller 
knew that the machine sold to Chemical had malfunctioned and that the seller 
had, in fact, inspected Chemical's facility shortly after the damage was sus-
tained. The supreme court, however, opted for the more liberal view of notice 
reflected in the first sentence of the second paragraph of Comment 4 to U.C.C. 
section 2-607 which reads: "the content of notification need merely be sufficient 
to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be 
watched."133 Moreover, the court did not rule out the possibility that this notice 
may be inferred. However, in the event the fact-finder later determined that 
even under this lenient standard the notice was insufficient, the court turned to 
the question of whether the subrogee's filing of this complaint could fulfill the 
notice requirement. Refusing to draw distinctions based on status or the nature 
of the injury, the court stated that a filing could be sufficient, but not where, as 
here, the claim is filed more than two years after the damages were sustained. 
A different distinction surfaced in Daugherty v. Farmers Cooperative Associa-
tion.134 In Daugherty, the original action was brought by plaintiffs against, 
among others, Stauffer Chemical Company ("Stauffer") for injuries caused by 
their use of Cythion 5-E (malathion). Following the trial court's dismissal of the 
case on statute of limitations grounds and the subsequent reversal by the 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Stauffer impleaded the manufacturer of the drug, 
130. For the relevance of this distinction, the court cites 4 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial 
Code§ 2-607:38, at 142-43 (1983). 
131. 42 Ohio St. 3d 40, 537 N.E.2d 624, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 88 (1989). For more on this 
case, see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
132. This strict approach finds support in the last sentence of comment 4 to U.C.C. section 
2-607 which reads: "(t]he notification which saves the buyer's rights under this Article need only be 
such as informs the seller that the transaction is claimed to inuolue a breach, and thus opens the way 
for normal settlement through negotiation." (Emphasis added.) Cases which have applied this 
standard include Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 19 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 353 (5th Cir. 1976); Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 35 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 1435 (6th Cir. 1983). 
133. The court reiterated this position in AGF, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., 51 Ohio 
St. 3d 177, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 859 (1990}. Other cases applying this standard include Prutch 
v. Ford Motor Co., 618 P.2d 657, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1507 (Colo. 1980); Paulson v. Olson 
Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 319 N.W.2d 855, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 146 (1982). 
134. 790 P.2d 1118, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 867 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989). This time the 
distinguishing feature was the nature of the claim. 
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American Cyanamid. Concluding that the entry of summary judgment in favor 
of American Cyanamid was in error, the court of appeals held that failure to 
comply with U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a) was not a defense to a claim for implied 
indemnity. There is language in the opinion suggesting that the court would not 
have been so willing to dispense with the need for notice had the case not been of 
the product liability type. 135 Even so, one must wonder whether the court's view 
conflicts with the policy underlying the notice requirement. What of the 
manufacturer against whom an indemnification claim is made and who wishes 
to fault the immediate seller for, perhaps, faulty installation? Might the ability 
to construct this defense be impaired by the failure to receive notice? 136 
Two cases raise the recurring issue of what, if any, burden of notice should be 
placed on the third-party beneficiary claimant. The first case is Ratkovich v. 
Smithkline. 137 The district court, relying on cases construing U.C.C. section 
2-607(3)(a),138 held that the statutory forerunner to the Code (the Illinois Sales 
Act) required a non-buyer to notify the manufacturer. Hence, the plaintiff's 
warranty claim against Smithkline (the manufacturer) for brain damage she 
suffered in utero when her mother took the drug Dexadrine was barred. The 
second case is Ragland Mills, Inc. v. General Motors Corp. 139 In that case, the 
Missouri Court of Appeals gives U.C.C. section 2-607(3)(a) a different reading. 
In its opinion, a buyer is only obligated to give notice to its immediate seller.140 
The problem with this approach is that it is premised on the questionable 
assumption that each buyer in the chain of distribution will notify its immediate 
seller. This may not occur when, for example, the end user skips the middlemen 
and sues the manufacturer directly or if the view that notice is not required in 
order to preserve the right to indemnity is accepted. 
Finally, one topic which continues to receive judicial attention relates to the 
intermesh between a buyer's right to revoke acceptance and a seller's right to 
cure. Because U.C.C. section 2-508 refers only to rejection, a majority of courts 
have held that there is no right to cure when a buyer justifiably revokes. 141 With 
its decision in City National Bank of Charleston v. Wells, 142 the West Virginia 
135. See id. at 1120, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 869 ("We decline to hold a third party plaintiff 
in such a suit to the 'reasonable notice' requirements provided by the U.C.C. for commercial 
settings"). (Emphasis added.) 
136. For this reason there is authority that the characterization of the claim as one for indemnity 
does not excuse notice. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cannon, 53 Md. App. 106, 452 
A.2d 192 (1982), aff'd, 295 Md. 528, 456 A.2d 930 (1983). 
137. 711 F. Supp. 436, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 118 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
138. In particular, the court relied on Berry v. G.D. Searle & Co., 56 Ill. 2d 548, 309 N.E.2d 
550, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 346 (1974). See also U.C.C. § 2-607, Official Comment 5 ("the reason of 
the section does extend to requiring the beneficiary to notify the seller that an injury has occurred"). 
139. 763 S.W.2d 357, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). 
140. Notice that unlike the plaintiff in Ratkovich, the plaintiff in Ragland had purchased from 
someone. Thus, upstream notice to the manufacturer is more of a possibility in the latter case than 
in the former. 
141. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1318 (8th Cir. 1974); 
Gappelberg v. Landrum, 666 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1984). 
142. 384 S.E.2d 374, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 798 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1989). 
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Supreme Court of Appeals seemingly joins this majority. 143 Although no explicit 
right of cure is given, it could be argued that whatever cure rights exist under 
U.C.C. section 2-508(1) are implicitly available to the seller under U.C.C. 
section 2-608(3 ). 144 The seller also should have the right to cure under U.C.C. 
section 2-508(2), although presently there is no statutory support for such a 
result. 145 
REPUDIATION 
The decision in Neptune Research &- Development, Inc. v. Teknics Indus-
trial Systems, /nc. 146 appears to point out very strongly the need to proceed 
cautiously when looking to non-Code law as a source of guidance for informed 
decisionmaking under the Code. The buyer in that case ordered a precision drill 
from the seller to be delivered sometime during mid-June of 1986; there was no 
"time-of-the-essence" clause in the contract. After the contract was negotiated, 
the seller discovered a design defect in the drill and took steps to correct it. 
When the buyer tried to establish a delivery date in early June, the seller 
hedged. Eventually, the buyer became impatient and visited the seller's shop in 
late August; at this time the drill was still being assembled. Although the 
redesigned drill was missing a "linear ballbearing raise" the buyer agreed to 
take it anyway and the parties agreed to a September 5 delivery date. When the 
buyer called on September 4 to confirm delivery, the seller indicated an inability 
to deliver until the 9th or 10th. The buyer then cancelled the contract and 
refused seller's offer later that day to deliver on September 5 as previously 
agreed. On these facts, the trial court found that the buyer had properly 
cancelled and was entitled to the return of its deposit. 
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed. The court declined to 
accept the trial court's view that the failure to deliver in mid-June constituted a 
repudiation because "there was nothing in the surrounding circumstances to 
indicate that the initial time of performance was essential."147 However, the 
buyer's agreement to accept the redesigned drill was predicated upon the 
143. The court hedges a bit when it says "[t]his is especially true where, as here, the seller has 
previously been given the opportunity to correct the defect and has either failed or refused to do so." 
Id. at 381, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 805. The court does recognize an implied right to cure under 
limited circumstances by virtue of U.C.C. section 2-608(1 )(a) (revocation may be permitted if the 
goods were accepted "on the reasonable assumption that [the] nonconformity would be cured and it 
has not been seasonably cured"). 
144. Under U.C.C. section 2-608(3) "[a] buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties 
with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them." The Article 2 Study Group has 
recommended that the right to cure be explicitly extended to revocation situations. See Prelim. Rpt., 
Part 5, Rec. A2.5(5)(A); Id. Part 6, Rec. A2.6(6)(B). 
145. The Article 2 Study Group split on this question. See Prelim. Rpt., Part 5, Rec. 
A2.5(5)(B). 
146. 235 N.J. Super. 522, 563 A.2d 465, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 107 (1989). 
147. Id. at 531, 563 A.2d at 470, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 113. Because the failure to deliver 
in mid-June does not involve "a performance not yet due," U.C.C. section 2-610, it would seem 
more appropriate to refer to it in terms of "current breach" rather than "anticipatory repudiation." 
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"express condition that the seller have the product available by September 5."148 
Now, according to the court, time was of the essence and the seller's statement 
that the drill would not be available on the promised date was a repudiation 
under U.C.C. section 2-610. 149 The court then turned to the issue of whether 
the seller had effectively retracted its repudiation. Relying primarily on the 
express language of U .C.C. section 2-611(1),150 the court held that cancellation 
barred a subsequent retraction even in the absence of prejudice. 151 
The analytical mistake made by the court was to assume a unity of contract 
doctrine which does not exist. Although the time for performance is not 
normally of the essence under most contracts, the rule has always been different 
where the contract calls for the delivery of goods. 152 Things are no different 
under the Code: a delayed delivery would normally justify rejection under 
U.C.C. section 2-601. 153 Therefore, notwithstanding the court's conclusion to 
the contrary, the seller's failure to deliver in mid-June was a material breach 
148. Id. at 532, 563 A.2d at 471, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 114. 
149. The court, seeing no substantive difference between the "substantially impair" standard of 
U.C.C. section 2-610 and the "materiality" standard of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
section 241, relied heavily on the latter. Section 241 provides: 
In determining whether a failure to render or to offer performance is material, the following 
circumstances are significant: 
(a) the extent to which the injured party will be deprived of the benefit which he 
reasonably expected; 
(b) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for the part of 
that benefit of which he will be deprived; 
~c) the extent to which the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer 
forfeiture; 
(d) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will cure his 
failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any reasonable assurances; 
(e) the extent to which the behavior of the party failing to perform or to offer to perform 
comports with standard of good faith and fair dealing. 
The court considered the statement on September 4 in light of the totality of circumstances 
surrounding the transaction, including the seller's failure to call the buyer on September 3 as 
promised. 
150. U.C.C. section 2-611(1) reads adollows: 
Until the repudiating party's next performance is due he can retract his repudiation unless 
the aggrieved party has since the repudiation cancelled or materially changed his position or 
otherwise indicated that he considers the repudiation final. 
151. Also addressed by the court was the seller's vague contention that it had the right to cure 
under U .C.C. section 2-508( 1 ). The court pointed out that the language of the section limits its 
applicability to situations where there has been rejection following a nonconforming tender or 
delivery. Here, the contract had been cancelled before there was any attempt made to deliver. 
152. See, e.g., Norrington v. Wright, 115 U.S. 188 (1885); Oshinsky v. Lorraine Mfg. Co., 187 
F. 120 (2d Cir. 1911). 
153. The "perfect tender" rule of U.C.C. section 2-601 permits rejection "if the goods or tender 
of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the contract. ... " However, a court should be able to use 
the general obligation of good faith, see U.C.C. section 1-203, to frustrate a buyer who rejects in bad 
faith. 
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and did give the buyer the right to cancel. 154 What was not explored by the court 
is the problematic relationship between section 2-610 and section 2-601. If 
delivery of the drill on September 9 rather than September 5 would not have 
"substantially impair[ed] the value of the contract to the [buyer]"155 then the 
statement on September 4 would not have amounted to a repudiation. Yet, when 
the drill was delivered on September 9 the buyer could have rejected it. It could 
be that in this context, the contribution of U.C.C. section 2-610 is less important 
than it seems. 156 
REJECTION AND REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE 
As in past years, a number of courts are again struggling with the issue of 
whether a remote buyer should be afforded a right of revocation as against a 
remote seller. Because the remedy is generally considered to be available only 
against the immediate seller, 157 the cases invariably involve attempts to resist 
this conclusion by buyers who emphasize the somewhat different factual settings 
of their cases. In Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 158 the buyers were 
assured by the seller's salesman that the floor of their new mobile home was 
constructed with a new material called "Novadeck." The salesman based this 
representation on what he was told by the manufacturer's salesman. When the 
home developed a leak which damaged the floor, the buyers learned from the 
manufacturer's service representative that it was made of ordinary particle 
board. The trial court held that revocation was available against the manufac-
turer. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. It held that 
neither the statements made by the manufacturer's representative to the seller's 
salesman nor the visits to the home by the manufacturer's service representative 
created the requisite contractual relationship between the buyers and the 
manufacturer. But what of the argument that privity was not necessary because 
the manufacturer had made an express warranty directly to the buyers? 159 
154. Although the remedy of cancellation was lost when the contract was modified in late 
August (the trial court was unsure whether a new or amended contract was created), the buyer 
might have retained the right to recover damages on account of the delay. The answer would depend 
on a more accurate characterization of the facts which, in turn, would make it possible to know 
which Code sections were applicable. See V.C.C. §§ 1-207 ("performance or acceptance under 
reservation of rights"); 2-209 ("modification, rescission and waiver"); 2-720 ("effect of 'cancellation' 
or 'rescission' on claims for antecedent breach"). 
155. u.c.c. § 2-610. 
156. Notwithstanding the absence of a repudiation, the buyer could, nonetheless, proceed to 
make alternative arrangements knowing that it could later cancel if and when the good was 
eventually tendered. 
157. The view is premised on the words "the seller" which appear twice in U.C.C. section 
2-608. Under U.C.C. section 2-608(1), the buyer may revoke acceptance of substantially noncon-
forming goods if, among other things, "the seller's assurances induced the buyer's acceptance." 
Further, revocation is not effective until the buyer notifies "the seller" of it. U.C.C. § 2-608(2). 
158. 94 N.C. App. 754, 381 S.E.2d 478, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1253 (1989). 
159. At the time they purchased the home, the buyers received a 365-day manufacturer's limited 
warranty covering defects in material and workmanship. Revocation has been permitted against a 
manufacturer that has expressly warranted the goods to the ultimate buyer. See, e.g., Durfee v. Rod 
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Because it had not been submitted to the jury and not properly raised on appeal, 
it was not considered by the court. 
The issue of a direct manufacturer's warranty was, however, before the court 
in Gochey v. Bombardier, lnc. 160 In this case, the buyer of a defective snowmo-
bile received at the time of purchase an express limited warranty from the 
manufacturer pursuant to which it covenanted to repair or replace defective 
components, materials or workmanship without charge. The trial court permit-
ted revocation on the theory that the snowmobile dealer was the manufacturer's 
agent. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont agreed that revocation against 
the manufacturer was proper, but for a different reason. The court held that a 
direct contract with the buyer was created when the manufacturer's warranty 
was passed on by the dealer. 161 
Another way to resist application of the general proscription against revoca-
tion by a non-privity buyer is demonstrated by Smith v. Navistar International 
Transportation Corp. 162 In Smith, the defective item was a semi-tractor truck 
manufactured by Navistar and financed through Navistar Financial Corp. 
("Navistar Financial"). After notifying the dealer, Navistar, and Navistar 
Financial that he was revoking his acceptance, the buyer brought suit against 
the three, seeking damages from the dealer and Navistar.163 Navistar Financial 
then moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim for unpaid installments 
and possession of the truck. While acknowledging that ordinarily revocation is 
not effective against the party financing the sale, the court denied judgment 
because the facts appeared to bring the situation squarely within the "close 
connection doctrine." 164 Here, Navistar and Navistar Financial were members 
Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 945 (Minn. 1977); Volkswagen of 
America, Inc. v. Novak, 418 So. 2d 801, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1150 (Miss. 1982); Ventura v. Ford 
Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801, 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 57 (1981). 
160. 572 A.2d 921, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 870 (Vt. 1990). Since the suit was brought under 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2301-2312 (West 1982), the court had to 
decide whether revocation was an available remedy for breach of a limited warranty. The court 
reasoned that because the Act makes no provision for remedies and section 231 l(b)(l) preserves 
"any right or remedy of any consumer under State law or any other Federal law," revocation under 
U.C.C. section 2-608 was not precluded. 
161. Referring to its recent decision in Costa v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 150 Vt. 213, 551 
A.2d 1196, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 389 (1988), the court noted that the case was being overruled to 
the extent it implied that revocation was not available against the manufacturer absent an agency 
relationship. 
162. 714 F. Supp. 303, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 790 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
163. No mention is made of the nature of the relief sought from Navistar Financial. Presumably, 
the buyer was asking to have the installment contract cancelled and the paid installments returned. 
164. According to the court, "a buyer who obtains financing through an entity closely connected 
to the seller may use the seller's breach of its duties to the buyer as a defense to liability under the 
financing instrument." 714 F. Supp. at 309, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 797. However, the court's 
characterization of the buyer's defense as "revocation" suggests that the close connection doctrine 
was being used to accommodate more than just a defense; it would also support the buyer's 
affirmative claim to recover all payments previously made. 
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of the same corporate family and the loan contract had been approved by a 
Na vis tar dealer. 165 
A final case involving the right to revoke against one other than the immedi-
ate seller is Hart Honey Co. v. Cudworth. 166 Hart Honey purchased "supers" 
(wooden frames which are stacked to form beehives) from Cudworth. Unknown 
to Hart Honey, Cudworth had previously agreed to allow Bracken Honey Bee 
Corporation ("Bracken Honey") perpetual use of this equipment for $10,000. 
Cudworth retained title and the right to sell the supers at any time with the 
understanding that if they were sold, Cudworth would receive the first $35,000 
in proceeds and Bracken Honey the remainder. Consequently, a portion of the 
$62,250 purchase price paid by Hart Honey went to Bracken Honey. The 
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the right to use the equipment and 
share in the proceeds did not make Bracken Honey a seller for purposes of 
revocation or any other remedy.167 Recognizing that Bracken Honey might 
qualify as a "person in the position of a seller,'' the court said that this status 
creates no liability for breach. 168 
The Supreme Court of West Virginia, in Kesner v. Lancaster, 169 discussed 
several questions relative to a buyer's right to revoke acceptance. First, it quite 
correctly rejected the seller's ludicrous contention that U.C.C. section 2-608 
does not apply unless one of the parties is a merchant. Clearly, the scope of 
article 2 is defined by the subject matter of the transaction, not the status of the 
parties.170 Next, the court examined the requirement that the non-conformity in 
the goods must substantially impair their value to the buyer. The seller argued 
that where, as here, the price paid for the tractor-loader was $9,000 and the cost 
of repairs was estimated to be $720 the defects were insubstantial as a matter of 
law. Applying a hybrid subjective/objective test, 171 the court decided that the 
165. Although not explicitly addressed by the court, the buyer had the right to revoke against 
Navistar (the manufacturer) because of its breach of an express "repair and replace" warranty. 
166. 446 N.W.2d 742, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 405 (N.D. 1989). 
167. Under U.C.C. section 2-103(1)(d) a "seller" is defined as "a person who sells or contracts 
to sell goods." A "sale" is "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." U.C.C. 
§ 2-106(1). Actually, the facts indicate that the supers were never accepted by Hart Honey. If that 
were true (it would make no substantive difference if it were) then the appropriate remedy would be 
rejection, not revocation. 
168. U.C.C. section 2-707 gives a "person in the position of a seller" the right to withhold or 
stop delivery, resell, and recover incidental damages. As the court points out, it "does not create an 
additional category of 'sellers' who will be liable to the buyer upon breach of the contract." 446 
N.W.2d at 744, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 409. 
169. 378 S.E.2d 649, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 122 (W. Va. 1989). 
170. See U.C.C. section 2-102 ("Unless the context otherwi~e requires, this Article applies to 
transactions in goods .... "). 
171. The court explained the test as follows: 
This section ... creates a subjective test in the sense that the needs and circumstances of the 
particular buyer must be examined. This determination is not, however, made by reference to 
the buyer's personal belief as to the reduced value of the goods in question. The trier of fact 
must make an objective determination that the value of the goods to the buyer has in fact been 
substantially impaired. 
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jury's determination that the value of the loader, which was inoperable and 
needed major repairs, had been substantially impaired was not clearly errone-
ous. The court also felt there was sufficient evidence for the jury to decide that 
the non-conformity could not reasonably have been discovered prior to accep-
tance. It noted that unless a defect is reasonably apparent or the buyer has some 
special expertise, a buyer who has made a reasonable inspection of goods and 
failed to find the defect has satisfied the "difficulty of discovery" text. 172 
Every year brings decisions considering whether the buyer's right of revoca-
tion is defeated by the continued use of the goods. In Triad Systems Corp. v. 
Alsip, 173 the Tenth Circuit held that post-revocation use of a computer system 
did not as a matter of law bar revocation. The question for the jury was whether 
the use was reasonable. The court in Steers Security, Inc. v. Sportscoach Corp. 
of America174 adopted a similar approach when the problem arose because of the 
buyer's post-revocation use of a motorhome. In the court's view, reacceptance 
occurs only if the continued use is inconsistent with the seller's ownership. 
Because an isolated instance of use is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
seller's ownership, it could not be said as a matter of law that the buyer 
reaccepted the home when he used it to transport his daughter to the hospital. 
Overall, the result in these two cases seems fair. It is likely, however, that 
perceptions of the reasonableness of the use will to some extent be influenced by 
whether the buyer is obligated to compensate the seller for the value of that 
use. 175 
Last year we asked the question whether the delivery of conforming goods to 
the buyer necessarily entitles the seller to the purchase price. 176 The answer 
then was no, this year it is yes. In Lipsey Motors v. Karp Motors, Inc., 177 Lipsey 
purchased three cars from Karp. Lipsey anticipated selling the cars and using 
the proceeds to pay Karp. After two of the cars sat on Lipsey's lot for 
approximately four months, Mr. Lipsey apparently concluded that they could 
not be sold and returned them to Karp. The court of appeals held that 
notwithstanding their rejection, Karp could recover the price of the cars. In so 
doing, it misread U.C.C. section 2-703. Although the section is applicable to 
172. 378 S.E.2d at 655, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 131. The buyer noted that the machine had 
been freshly painted, the undercarriage was in good condition, and the engine ran well. It was not 
until the machine stopped running, and the buyer removed the seats, floorboard, and belly pan that 
the defects were discovered. The court also pointed to U.C.C. section 2-608(1 )(b) and indicated that 
the seller's assurances prior to acceptance that the machine was in "fine shape" might have absolved 
the buyer from a duty of inspection. 
173. 880 F.2d 247, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 567 (10th Cir. 1989). 
174. 99 Or. App. 363, 781 P.2d 1267, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 788 (1989). 
175. Not all courts have read the Code as supporting an award of compensation to the seller for 
the value of the buyer's use of the goods prior to their return to the seller. See, e.g., Barco Auto 
Leasing Corp. v. House, 202 Conn. 106, 520 A.2d 162, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 122 (1987). 
, 176. See Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 
45 Bus. Law. 2289, 2311-13 (1990) (discussing Integrated Circuits Unlimited v. E. F. Johnson Co., 
8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 695 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
177. 194 Ga. App. 15, 389 S.E.2d 537, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 799 (1989). 
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wrongful rejections,17s it recognizes the right to recover the price only "in a 
proper case" under U.C.C. section 2-709.179 The court never decided whether 
this was such a case. 1so Yet, the court reached the correct result. Clearly having 
accepted the cars, Lipsey could no longer effectively reject. Rather, his attempt 
was to revoke which, if substantively wrongful, is always ineffective. 1s1 
RECLAMATION 
If the past year is any indication, the number of reported cases involving 
reclamation issues appears to be on the wane, and of those that were decided, 
most involved little that was new or of particular interest. In addition to the 
occasional seller who needs to be told that the right to reclaim under U.C.C. 
section 2-702 depends upon simultaneous compliance with Bankruptcy Code 
section 546(c),1s2 we continue to be treated to the dubious conclusion that section 
546(c) authorizes substitution of an administrative expense claim or alternative 
lien for the claim of a right of reclamation which is subordinate to the interest of 
a secured party (as a good faith purchaser) in those same goods. 1s3 However, 
one case, Conoco, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. (In re Braniff, Inc.), 1s4 did involve 
unexplored issues of importance. · 
Before the court was Conoco's demand to reclaim aviation fuel supplied to 
Braniff at the Dallas-Fort Worth and Kansas City airports. 185 Conoco was 
Braniff's only supplier at Dallas-Fort Worth; it was one of Braniff's four 
178. See U.C.C. § 2-602(3) ("The seller's rights with respect to goods wrongfully rejected are 
governed by the provisions of this Article on Seller's remedies in general (section 2-703 )"). 
179. Specifically, U.C.C. section 2-703(e) provides that the aggrieved seller may "recover 
damages for non-acceptance (section 2-708) or in a proper case the price (section 2-709) .... " 
180. By focusing on the remedy of rejection, the court implicitly assumes that the cars were 
never accepted: an assumption which is patently at odds with the facts. Regardless of its correctness, 
this assumption eliminates the most common statutory basis for recovering the price. See U.C.C. 
§ 2-709. The right to the price would therefore depend on the ability of Karp to resell the cars at a 
reasonable price. See U.C.C. § 2-709(1)(b). Interestingly, the court did find that Karp's futile 
attempts to sell the cars after they had been returned supported the jury's conclusion that reasonable 
steps were taken to mitigate damages. 
181. See Frisch & Wladis, supra note 176, at 2311-13. 
182. See In re Dynamic Technologies Corp., 106 Bankr. 994, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 68 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1989). While not all courts have held that 11 U.S.C.A. section 546(c) codifies an 
independent avoiding power, see, e.g., Farmers Rice Milling Co. v. Hawkins (In re Bearhouse, 
Inc.), 84 Bankr. 552, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1124 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1988), the overwhelming 
majority have. 
183. See In re Roberts Hardware Co., 103 Bankr. 396, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 130 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1988). See also In re Misco Supply Co., 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1662 (D. Kan. 1986). The 
consequence of these cases is that the seller obtains more than it would have had the buyer not gone 
into bankruptcy. The logic of this is difficult to grasp. Fortunately, there are cases to the contrary. 
See, e.g., In re Lawrence Paperboard Corp., 52 Bankr. 907, 42 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 185 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1985 ). 
184. 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 519 (1990). 
185. Conoco also had delivered fuel to several other airports but, because of an inability to 
establish the "identification and control" elements of its claim, it was forced to abandon its case for 
reclamation at trial. 
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suppliers at Kansas City. The fuel was delivered to each location through an 
interstate common carrier pipeline from which it was directed into "tank farm" 
storage facilities operated by Braniff's fueling agent, Ogden Allied Aviation 
Services ("Ogden"). The fuel which Conoco sought to reclaim was that which 
was delivered within the 10-day period preceding the demand and which 
exhausted the credit balance in Braniff's account for prepayment of fuel and 
established a balance due. 186 
First, the court dealt with Braniff's contention that the demand for reclama-
tion was legally insufficient because it did not adequately identify what fuel 
Conoco sought to reclaim. Braniff argued that despite the fact that each 
shipment was described by bill of lading number, shipment date, net gallons, 
and product cost, it was not able to determine when and where deliveries were 
made and which shipments were paid for in advance until it received monthly 
statements from Conoco and Ogden. Bankruptcy judge Corcoran held that the 
notice was sufficient. Since Ogden was Braniff's agent, its ability to identify the 
fuel described in Conoco's notice was properly attributable to Braniff. 
Next, after deciding that Braniff had the requisite control over the fuel in the 
tank farms, the court turned to the critical "identification" issue.187 With respect 
to fungible, bulk petroleum products, such as jet fuel, the court pointed out that 
Conoco must at a minimum be able to trace into an identifiable mass containing 
only fuel of like grade and quality. As to the Dallas-Fort Worth shipment, that 
was all that was necessary where, at the time of the demand, there was a 
sufficient amount of fuel on hand to cover the shipment in question. As to the 
deliveries at Kansas City which were commingled with fuel delivered by 
Conoco's three other suppliers, Judge Corcoran adopted what he described as a 
"'first in, first out' theory of bulk fuel use."188 Because Braniff's evidence did 
not reflect when and in what amounts the deliveries from other suppliers were 
made during the 10-day reclamation period, its claim was denied. 
Finally, the court had to decide on the appropriate remedy where, as here, 
Braniff used all the fuel that it had on hand at Dallas-Fort Worth at the time of 
186. Braniff was required by agreement to prepay each Wednesday for its estimated purchases 
of fuel during the following week. Thus, some of the fuel delivered during the reclamation period 
had been paid for in advance. 
187. The court set out the following four-part test for reclamation: 
1. the debtor was insolvent at the time the goods were delivered by the seller; 
2. a written demand was made on the debtor within to days after the goods were delivered to 
the debtor; 
3. the goods were identifiable at the time the demand was made; and 
4. the goods were in the possession and control of the debtor at the time the demand was made. 
t t U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 526. 
t 88. Id. at 532. 
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the demand. The remedy chosen was an administrative claim equal in amount 
to the invoice price of the fuel. 189 
The easiest and safest comment to make on the case might be that it is 
analytically barren. While the case supports identifying goods by means of a 
tracing fiction, it does so without regard for the dual nature of the conflict 
involved. On the one hand, there is the conflict between two or more sellers 
seeking to reclaim goods that have become commingled. As between them, it 
might make sense to allocate their interests according to some fictional device 
such as a first in, first out or lowest intermediate balance rule. 190 On the other 
hand, there is the conflict between the seller and the pool of general creditors. 
Whether tracing should be permitted in this context is another matter entirely. 
At the very least, the court should have made some effort to establish whether 
applicable state law recognizes the right to trace under U.C.C. section 2-702. 
Interestingly, the Article 2 Study Group on a closely related issue has tenta-
tively concluded (no reasons are given) that a reclaiming seller should not have a 
right to proceeds. 191 
BUYER'S MONEY REMEDIES AND THEIR 
LIMITATIONS 
The article 2 norm of freedom of contract is perhaps best expressed in Official 
Comment 1 to U.C.C. section 2-719 where the drafters stated that their 
intention was to leave the parties "free to shape their remedies to their 
particular requirements .... " Because of the bargaining position of well-
leveraged sellers, it is not uncommon to find that a buyer has contractually 
surrendered the available remedies under the Code for the sole right to have the 
seller repair or replace the defective good or its parts.192 
However, the drafters also believed that "it is of the very essence of a sales 
contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available."193 Thus, the 
189. The court disagreed with Conoco that it was entitled to both an administrative claim and a 
lien. Judge Corcoran correctly pointed out that U.S.C.A. section 546(c)(2) provides for alternative 
not cumulative remedies. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(c)(2) (West 1979 & Supp. 1991 ). 
190. Surprisingly, the court never even considered the lowest intermediate balance rule which, in 
a commercial analogue, is commonly employed by secured parties to artificially identify cash 
proceeds of collateral which have been deposited and commingled in a bank account. See, e.g., C.O. 
Funk & Sons, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 89 Ill. 2d 27, 59 Ill. Dec. 85, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982). 
See also In re Halmar Distrib., Inc., 116 Bankr. 328 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (court determines 
secured party's claim to commingled inventory on the basis of a rule analogous to the lowest 
intermediate balance rule). 
191. See Preliminary Report, Rec. A2.7(2)(c)(6). 
192. See U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a). This section provides in part: 
the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in 
this Article and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by 
limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price or to repair and 
replacement of nonconforming goods or parts .... 
193. U.C.C. § 2-719 Official Comment 1. 
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objective is to foster freedom of contract, but not to the extent that a party is 
deprived "of the substantial value of the bargain."194 To this end, if a limited 
remedy has failed of its essential purpose, then the door is opened to the full 
range of Code remedies. 195 This year as in past annual surveys, most of the cases 
which alleged failure of essential purpose involve the limited remedy of repair 
or replacement. The conclusion that failure has occurred usually follows from 
an inability or unwillingness on the part of the seller to remedy the defects. 196 
One case demonstrates that the scope of the inquiry should not be so limited. In 
Reigel Power Corp. v. Voith Hydro, 197 the plaintiffs' assignor purchased an 
electric turbine which went into operation in mid-1984. According to the 
plaintiffs, the turbine was inoperable for about half the time between 1984 and 
1987 when it finally became operational. The Fourth Circuit, applying Dela-
ware law, held that the considerable operation time lost during repairs did not, 
in and of itself, cause the repair or replacement remedy to fail of its essential 
purpose. 198 In so doing it emphasized the fact that the sale was a commercial 
sale of a complicated product. 199 To avoid the limitation, in this instance, the 
buyer would have to show that the seller refused or was unable to cure the 
problem. 
Another case illustrates the wisdom of providing for a backup remedy in the 
event the limited remedy fails to accomplish its essential purpose. In Ritchie 
Enterprises v. Honeywell Bull, /nc.,200 the contract for the sale of a computer 
provided that if the seller was unable to cure its defects, the seller would be 
liable for actual damages not to exceed the purchase price. Even though the 
seller was unable to get the computer to work properly, the district court 
concluded that the existence of an available backup remedy prevented the 
failure of the limited remedy. Thus, the court escaped the need to decide 
194. Id. 
195. See id.§ 2-719(2) ("[w]here circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of 
its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."). 
196. Unfortunately, little guidance is offered as to when such a failure occurs, and as a result the 
caselaw is voluminous. Some recent cases include Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of 
America, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 558 (9th Cir. 1990); Great Dane Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern 
Pulpwood, Inc., 301 Ark. 436, 785 S.W.2d 13, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 875 (1990); Liberty Truck 
Sales, Inc. v. Kimbrel, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 908 (Ala. 1989). 
197. 888 F.2d 1043, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 552 (4th Cir. 1989). 
198. Actually, most of the court's opinion appears to be dicta. When the problems occurred the 
warranty period had expired. 
199. The court said that 
in determining whether the contract limitation fails of its essential purpose, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the contract, the nature of the basic obligations of the party, the 
nature of the goods involved, the uniqueness or experimental nature of the items, the general 
availability of the items, and the good faith and reasonableness of the provisions are factors 
which should be considered. 
888 F.2d at 1045, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 555 (quoting J.A. Jones Const. Co. v. Dover, 372 
A.2d 1 (Del. 1977)). 
200. 730 F. Supp. 1041, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1170 (D. Kans. 1990). 
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whether the contractual exclusion of consequential damages is vitiated by the 
failure of a limited remedy clause. 
Given that the concept of negotiated allocation of risks is central to cases like 
these, both courts presumably reached the correct result. In Voith Hydro, it is 
reasonable to assume from the limited remedy clause that the buyer had 
implicitly assumed the risk of loss during the period needed to correct the defects 
in the turbine. Similarly in Ritchie, the court did little more than to give effect 
to the allocation of risks reflected by the specific terms of the parties' contract. 
However, it is not unusual for one of the parties to argue that the contractual 
risk allocation should not be honored because a basic assumption on which it 
was made turns out to have been incorrect. When parties agree, for example, to 
limit the buyer's remedy to repair or replacement and, by separate provision, to 
exclude the right to recover consequential damages, the assumption probably is 
that the seller will be willing and able to cure all defects. If it later turns out that 
the seller will not or cannot, should the exclusion of consequentials remain 
enforceable? 
The caselaw is in such disarray that it is neither possible to predict how a 
court deciding this question for the first time will answer it, nor to foresee what, 
if any, analytical process will be employed. In Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas 
Corp. of America,201 the seller was unable after two and one-half years of trying 
to bring a horizontal batch tempering furnace up to contract specifications. 
Concluding that the limited repair remedy failed of its essential purpose, the 
court had to decide \\ hether the consequential damages exclusion was thus 
invalidated. The Ninth Circuit predicted that Washington courts would take a 
case-by-case approach and determine if the two provisions are either "'separa-
ble elements of risk allocation' or 'inseparable parts of a unitary package of risk-
allocation' "202 and if the latter, whether the seller's "default caused a loss which 
was not part of the bargained-for allocation of risk."203 Influenced by the 
amount of the purchase price ($1.45 million), the seller's original representa-
tions and its lengthy attempt at repair, the court agreed with the district court's 
decision to li[t the cap on consequential damages. 
Not all courts this year have based their decisions on a risk allocation 
analysis. Some have adopted what looks like an absolute rule that the exclusion 
of consequentials is204 or is not invalidated.205 Finally there are those cases 
which leave us unsure of the courts' actual thinking. For example, in Canal 
201. 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 558 (9th Cir. 1990). 
202. Id. at 563-64 (quoting Fiorito Bros., Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1314-15 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (quoting district court)). 
203. Id. at 565. 
204. See, e.g., Ragen Corp. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1058, 1067 
(3d Cir. 1990) (under Wisconsin law "when the exclusive remedy fails ... the buyer can proceed to 
any remedy available under the U.C.C. including consequential damages .... "). 
205. See, e.g., Riegel Power Corp. v. Voith Hydro, 888 F.2d 1043, 1047, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1989) (Although dictum, the court seemingly aligns itself with "the more 
recent cases [indicating) that the two provisions are independent and are to be applied as such"). 
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Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,206 the Supreme Court of Massa-
chusetts uses fairly strong language to make the point that the limitation of 
remedies and the exclusion of consequentials are entirely separate provisions.207 
Yet, the court seemingly attaches some relevance to its observation that the 
equipment and parties were sophisticated and the seller acted neither wilfully 
nor in bad faith. How this court will dispose of future cases remains to be seen. 
Despite several cases decided this survey period which presume conscion-
ability in purely commercial transactions,208 the number of decisions holding 
such limitations of liability to be ineffective in commercial cases continues to 
grow. In Construction Associates, Inc. v. Fargo Water Equipment Co.,209 the 
plaintiff purchased from Fargo Water a large supply of polyvinyl chloride pipe 
manufactured by Johns-Manville Sales Corporation ("J-M"). The jury found 
that the pipe was defective and awarded plaintiff $140,000 for expenses in-
curred in making repairs to a water supply line constructed with the pipe. The 
trial court ruled that the clause in the pipe installation guide which limited 
remedies and specifically excluded liability for consequential damages was 
unconscionable. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed. In so doing, it 
analyzed the clause in terms of both procedural and substantive unconscionabil-
ity. 210 The clause was procedurally unconscionable since the superior bargain-
ing strength of J-M gave it the power to dictate a term which was not bargained 
for and was not brought to the plaintiff's attention until long after the sales 
contract had been finalized. The clause was substantively unconscionable be-
cause it left the plaintiff without an effective remedy.211 Moreover, there was no 
way for the plaintiff to discover the defect prior to incurring substantial 
damages. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case is obliquely referenced to by 
the court in a footnote. 212 The facts show that the plaintiff first learned that its 
206. 406 Mass. 369, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 664 (1990). 
207. See id. at 375, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 669 ("The disclaimer of consequential damages 
is an entirely separate contractual provision from the limited repair or replacement remedy and thus 
survives the failure of the limited remedy"). 
208. See, e.g., Veeder v. NG Mach. Co., 720 F. Supp. 847, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 841 (W.D. 
Wash. 1989); Arena, Estate of v. Abbott & Cobb, Inc., 551 N.Y.S.2d 715, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
209. 446 N.W.2d 237, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 821 (N.D. 1989). 
210. "Courts and commentators have generally viewed the [C]ode's unconscionability provisions 
within a two-pronged framework: procedural unconscionability, which encompasses factors relating 
to unfair surprise, oppression, and inequality of bargaining power, and substantive unconscionabil-
ity, which focuses upon the harshness or one-sidedness of the contractual provision in question." Id. 
at 241, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 826. 
21 I. The limited remedy called for the replacement of defective pipe. However, the evidence 
showed that the accepted method of repair is not to replace pipe which has been laid, but to repair it 
with a stainless steel sleeve. 
212. See 446 N.W.2d at 243 n.7, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 828 n.7. The court questions, but 
does not decide, whether a limitation of remedies or exclusion of damages must be part of the basis 
of the bargain of the contract in order to be enforceable. 
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remedies were being limited or excluded after the time of contracting. On what 
theory then does the clause become operative? Surely, the plaintiff never agreed 
to modify the contract so as to include the clause. To complicate matters further, 
let us not forget that the plaintiff was not in privity with J-M. It is presently 
uncertain to what extent a remote seller may assert remedy limitations when a 
non-privity plaintiff seeks recovery.213 
A final group of cases in the limitation of liability area is worth mentioning. 
Unlike U.C.C. section 2-316(2) (warranty disclaimers), U.C.C. section 
2-719( 1) does not specifically state that limitation of liability clauses must be 
"conspicuous." 
In Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Curry,214 the Wyoming Supreme Court held that 
a disclaimer of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness, printed 
toward the bottom of an insecticide sack in type approximately one-half the size 
of type used to provide other information, was not conspicuous and therefore 
was not effective. The court then reviewed language on the sack limiting buyer's 
remedies to return of the product's purchase price. Although it agreed with the 
seller that U.C.C. section 2-719 did not specifically require conspicuousness, the 
court held that such a limitation is implicit in the statutory scheme. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court relied on various decisions on statutory construction to 
the effect that the Wyoming legislature could not have intended to treat such 
similar provisions differently. The two statutes (2-316 and 2-719) must be 
considered in pari materia to avoid the "absurd" result suggested by the seller. 
The Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the same issue and reached the 
opposite result in Apex Supply Co., Inc. v. Bffnbow Industries, Inc. 215 In Apex, 
the trial court ruled that sales invoices disclaiming implied warranties for the 
construction of a greenhouse were ineffective under U.C.C. section 2-316 
because they were not conspicuous. However, that court granted a wholesaler 
and a distributor's motion for JNOV on the issue whether recovery of incidental 
and consequential damages were barred by language limiting recovery to the 
purchase price. The court of appeals affirmed, stating that it is the mere 
existence of the limitation of remedies language in U.C.C. section 2-719, 
without regard to its "conspicuousness," that is controlling. In its analysis, the 
court noted that there was a fundamental difference between the effect of a total 
disclaimer of any implied warranties and the mere limitation of available 
remedies. The court remarked that legislative intent was that U.C.C. section 
213. See Spagnol Enter., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
49 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (rights of a remote purchaser are unaffected by limitations of liability in 
the manufacturer's contract of sale). But see U.C.C. § 2-318 Official Comment 1 ("To the extent 
that the contract of sale .contains provisions under which ... remedies for breach are limited, such 
provisions are equally operative against beneficiaries of warranties under this section"). 
214. 778 P.2d 1083, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 342 (Wyo. 1989). 
215. 189 Ga. App. 598, 376 S.E.2d 694, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 547 (1988). See also Webster v. 
Sensormatic Electronic Corp., 193 Ga. App. 654, 389 S.E.2d 15, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 499 
(1989). 
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2-316 should have no bearing on the seller's ability to achieve the less compre-
hensive legal effect of limiting remedies under U.C.C. section 2-719. The issue 
of conspicuousness was "irrelevant." 
The best resolution lies in cases which treat the conspicuous issue as part of a 
broad unconscionability analysis under the terms of U.C.C. section 2-719(3).216 
The court's role then is to determine whether the bargaining strength and 
commercial sophistication of the parties made it reasonable that the limiting 
language was brought to the parties' attention. Actual knowledge should not be 
necessary. 
In other litigation, two courts have concluded that a new business is not 
necessarily foreclosed from recovering lost profits under U.C.C. section 
2-715(2).217 Although proving probable losses is no easy matter for a business 
without a track record, it may be possible to establish a sufficient factual basis 
for an award "with the aid of expert testimony, economic and financial data, 
market surveys and analyses, business records of similar enterprises, and the 
like."218 In another case, the Supreme Court of Arizona ruled that lost profits 
need not be specifically pleaded.219 It was enough that the plaintiff (a feeder pig 
operation) alleged that its profitability is based on the number of pigs it brings 
to market and that the seed purchased from the defendant caused the death of 
some pigs. 
SELLER'S MONEY REMEDIES 
The Code spells out several different measures of damages potentially avail-
able to the aggrieved seller. Stripped to their common underlying policy, each 
one seeks to put the seller "in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed .... "220 As in past annual surveys, there is no shortage of cases 
involving which measure, in light of the facts presented, best accomplishes this 
goal. Since the amount of recovery may be significantly affected depending on 
which measure is applied, the choice is understandably worth fighting for. 
216. See, e.g., AMF, Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 37 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 1583 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 34 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 857 (E.D. Wis. 1982). 
217. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 558 (9th 
Cir. 1990); AGF, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., 51 Ohio St. 3d 177, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d 859 ( 1990). 
218. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., 51 Ohio St. 3d at 181, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 865 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts 146, § 352 Comment b (1981)). The plaintiff's proof 
was insufficient in Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., but was sufficient in Se/as Corp. although based 
primarily on the testimony of a single expert, some of whose figures the district court found 
"difficult to swallow." 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 568. 
219. See Drew v. United Producers & Consumers Coop., 161 Ariz. 331, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
523 ( 1989). ("The prayer for relief simply asks for damages, without specifying the type in an 
amount to be proven at trial. ... "). Id. at 332, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 525. 
220. U.C.C. § 1-106(1) ("The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to 
the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had fully 
performed .... "). 
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Three cases illustrate areas in which the choice made by the seller has been 
questioned. 
The first and perhaps the most interesting case of the three is one which is not 
entirely within the transactional scope of article 2, Rheinberg Kellerei GmbH v. 
Brooks.field National Bank of Commerce. 221 The buyer ordered a shipment of 
wine from Rheinberg through an importer, Frank Sutton & Co. ("Sutton"). 
Payment was to be made through an international letter of collection222 which 
noted that payment was due "on arrival of goods in Houston harbor and called 
for the buyer's bank, Brooksfield National Bank ("Brooksfield") to notify 
Sutton "in case of any difficulty of lack [sic) payment." Although the wine did 
not arrive in Houston until March 31, Brooksfield presented the letter of 
collection on March 27, at which time it was told by the buyer to hold the letter 
until financing could be arranged. Nothing further occurred until early May, 
when Brooksfield cabled seller's bank for instructions after learning from Sutton 
that the wine was still at the Houston port. Unfortunately, by that time the 
wine had deteriorated completely. With the buyer out of business, Rheinberg 
brought this suit alleging that Brooksfield had negligently failed to give notice of 
buyer's nonpayment. On these facts, the trial court entered judgment for 
Brooksfield. 223 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. With respect to the duty to give notice 
of the buyer's nonpayment, the court held that notice was required under both 
the letter of collection224 and article 20(iii)(c) of the International Rules of 
Collection225 even though at the time the letter was presented, payment had not 
yet come due because the wine had not arrived. Turning then to the issue of 
damages, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was inappropriate to measure 
recovery under U.C.C. section 2-708(1).226 In the court's view, the seller was 
entitled to the full contract price under U.C.C. section 2-709 because the wine 
221. 901 F.2d 481, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1990). 
222. The letter was issued by the seller's bank and sent to the buyer's bank for presentment to 
the buyer. To receive the accompanying documents (bill of lading and invoices) and collect the 
goods, the buyer pays the amount due to its bank, which then forwards the funds to the seller's 
bank. The rights and responsibilities of the parties are governed by the ICC's International Rules 
for Collection. Id. at 482 n.2, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1216 n.2. 
223. The trial court concluded that Brooksfield had no knowledge of the buyer's default because 
it had no notice that the wine had arrived and no duty to inquire further. Id. at 483, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d at 1216. 
224. The court reasoned that, because the letter instructed Brooksfield to notify Sutton "in case 
of any difficulty of lack [sic) payment," it should have given notice when the buyer told it of the need 
to obtain financing. Id. at 483, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1217. 
225. Article 20(iii)(c) states that the "collecting bank must send without delay advice of non-
payment or advice of non-acceptance to the bank from whom the collection order was received." 
Looking to the Code for guidance, in particular, U.C.C. section 4-502, the court concluded that 
notice of nonpayment is required whether or not payment is then due. Id. at 483, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d at 1218. 
226. U.C.C. section 2-708( 1) establishes damages by computing the difference between the 
market price at the time and place for tender and the contract price. Id. at 484 n.8, U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d at 1219 n.8. 
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was damaged after the risk of loss had passed to the buyer.227 The problem with 
the opinion is that the court neglected to mention that the seller's right to the 
price under U.C.C. section 2-709(1 )(a) arises only if the loss occurs within a 
"commercially reasonable time."228 Recall that the wine sat at the port for more 
than a month. The court should have discussed in the alternative, whether a 
cause of action for the price existed because the buyer had accepted the wine. 229 
Thus, the opinion is not entirely persuasive. 
The second case is Bill's Coal Co., Inc. v. Board of Public Utilities of 
Springfield. 230 Here the parties entered into a long-term coal requirements 
contract. Eventually the relationship deteriorated and lawsuits followed.231 The 
Tenth Circuit was called upon to decide whether the sellers would be inade-
quately compensated under U.C.C. section 2-708(1), and consequently entitled 
to lost profits under U.C.C. section 2-708(2). Evidence presented at trial 
disclosed that during the contract period the sellers had difficulty meeting the 
buyer's needs. In fact, the sellers were forced to purchase coal from other 
suppliers because they had to close one of their two principal mines. Further-
more, the sellers' president admitted that they were able to sell to another 
customer only because the buyer refused to accept any more coal. On these facts, 
the Tenth Circuit affirmed, as not clearly erroneous,232 the trial court's finding 
that the sellers were not lost volume sellers,233 and thus U.C.C. section 2-708(1) 
was the proper measure of damages.234 
Finally, consider Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Holborn Oil Co., Ltd.235 Seller 
had purchased approximately 10 million gallons of gasoline at $1.26 per gallon 
227. The risk of loss had passed when the wine arrived in Houston and was available to be 
picked up by the buyer. See U.C.C. § 2-509(1)(b). 
228. The full text of U.C.C. section 2-709(1)(a) reads as follows: 
( 1) when the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover, together with 
any incidental damages under the next section, the price 
(a) of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially 
reasonable time after risk of their loss has passed to the buyer .... 
229. For what constitutes acceptance, see U.C.C. section 2-606. 
230. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1238 (10th Cir. 1989). 
231. The complete procedural history of the case can be found in Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of 
Public Util., 682 F.2d 883, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 166 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 
(1983). 
232. The court pointed out that whether a seller qualifies as a lost volume seller "is a decision 
dictated by the underlying facts and thus ultimately a question of fact reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard." 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1242. 
233. The court's definition of a "lost volume seller" was "one who has the capacity to perform 
the contract which was breached as well as other potential contracts, due to their unlimited 
resources or production capacity." Id. Other courts have expanded this definition to reflect what 
they perceive to be economic reality. They would shift the emphasis from the seller's capacity to 
perform other contracts to whether it would have been profitable to do so. See, e.g., R.E. Davis 
Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 369 (7th Cir. 1987). 
234. Additionally, the court held that litigation costs and accounting fees were not recoverable 
items of incidental damages under U.C.C. section 2-710. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1243. 
235. 547 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 814 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
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and alleged a contract with the defendant-buyer to sell at a price of $1.30 a 
gallon. When the market price suddenly dropped to about $.80 per gallon the 
buyer refused delivery and the seller resold to a third party for a price of $1.10 
per gallon.236 The sole issue before the court on cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment was whether the measure of damages should be governed by 
U.C.C. section 2-706237 or U.C.C. section 2-708(1). The seller argued that it 
was entitled to recover damages of $.50 pei: gallon (the difference between 
contract price and market price at the time of tender). The seller maintained 
that this figure would give it the $.34 per gallon total profit it would have 
earned had the buyer not breached. The seller's calculations added to the $.04 
per gallon expected profit on the contract with the buyer (difference between 
purchase price of $1.26 and contract price of $1.30), the $.30 per gallon profit 
that would have been earned on the sale to the third party (difference between 
purchase price of $.80 paid on the open market and contract price of $1.10). 
The buyer, on the other hand asserted that damages should be limited to $.20 
per gallon, representing the difference between the contract price and the resale 
price. 
Adopting the view of Professors White and Summers,238 the court held that 
U.C.C. section 2-703239 does not give an aggrieved seller the unfettered right to 
choose between U.C.C. section 2-706 and U.C.C. section 2-708. To ignore the 
resale in this case would, in the court's opinion, result in an unforeseen windfall 
due solely to variations in market prices. The court was correct. The seller's 
position arguably makes sense, but only if the sale to the third party would have 
been made irrespective of the buyer's breach.240 The court was careful to make 
the point that the facts indicated otherwise.241 
Notice that if the seller in Tesoro Petroleum had been successful in its bid to 
recover under U.C.C. section 2-708, it would have accomplished the often 
difficult task of receiving compensation for consequential losses (the Jost oppor-
tunity to earn a greater profit on the sale to the third party). The difficulty lies 
in the fact that the Code does not expressly recognize a seller's right to recover 
236. No explanation is offered as to why the third party was willing to pay a premium (about 
403 above market price) for the gasoline. 
237. The measure of damages under U.C.C. section 2-706 is the difference between the resale 
price and the contract price. 
238. See J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 354-56 (3d ed. 1988). 
239. U.C.C. section 2-703 provides that if a "buyer wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of 
the goods, ... then with respect to any goods directly affected ... , the aggrieved seller may ... (d) 
resell and recover damages as hereafter provided (section 2-706); [or] (e) recover damages for non-
acceptance (section 2-708) .... " 
240. In such a case it could not be said that the second sale was "reasonably identified as 
referring to the broken contract. ... " U.C.C. § 2-706(2). 
241. See 547 N.Y.S.2d 1017, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 820 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) ("The 
statement in plaintiff's reply memorandum of law ... that 'in all likelihood, (plaintiff) would have 
negotiated such a sale [to the third party] even in the absence of (defendant's) breach' is not 
supported by any facts in the record .... "). 
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consequential damages.242 The recent case of Florida Mining & Materials 
Corp. v. Standard Gypsum Corp.243 considered this issue. Although the opinion 
is silent as to the precise items of damages involved, they were clearly character-
ized as consequentials by the court. As such, the court of appeals summarily 
denied recovery. If a court is unwilling to expressly recognize such a recovery 
despite the Code's silence244 there are alternative methods of accomplishing the 
same result. Probably the most obvious is to argue that the loss falls under the 
heading of incidental damages.245 Recovery may also be possible if the "lost 
profit" language of U.C.C. section 2-708(2) is liberally applied.246 
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS 
Much of the tension in this area is directly attributable to the drafters' 
decision to choose tender of delivery as the time when a breach of warranty 
occurs and a cause of action accrues (a date-of-delivery rule).247 Three cases 
illustrate situations where there is a serious risk to the buyer that a breach of 
warranty action will be barred before the breach is actually discovered. 
The first of the three, Rosen v. Spanierman,248 presents a scenario likely to 
appear with some frequency as owners of artwork and other collectibles seek to 
cash in on a "hot" market, only later to learn, much to their chagrin, that what 
they own is not the real thing.249 Some 20 years after paying $15,000 to the IRA 
Spanierman Gallery for what they thought was an original painting by John 
Singer Sargent, the plaintiffs were told that it was not authentic and not worth 
the approximate $200,000 for which it had been appraised. On Spanierman's 
motion for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the limitations 
period had run on the warranty claim and that plaintiffs had failed to state a 
cause of action for fraud.250 
242. U.C.C. section 2-715 only addresses the buyer's right to incidental and consequential 
damages. 
243. 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
244. To deny the seller, in all cases, the recovery of consequentials would seem to run counter to 
the remedial policy expressed in U.C.C. section 1-106. The Article 2 Study Group has concluded 
that a seller should be able to recover consequential damages. See Article 2 Study Group, Prelim. 
Rpt., Part 7, Rec. A2.7(8) (Mar. 1, 1990). 
245. Incidental damages are recoverable under U.C.C. section 2-710. 
246. See, e.g., Rogerson Aircraft Corp. v. Fairchild Indus., 632 F. Supp. 1494, 1 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d 1512 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
247. Interestingly, the Article 2 Study Group was unable to reach any conclusions about U.C.C. 
section 2-725. See Article 2 Study Group, Prelim. Rpt., Part 7 (Mar. 1, 1990). 
248. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 846 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
249. This is not the first time that a case of this type has appeared in the annual survey. See 
Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 43 Bus. Law. 
1259, 1302 (1988) (discussing Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 
449 (E.D. Pa. 1987)); Frisch & Wladis, General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents 
of Title, 44 Bus. Law 1445, 1491-92 (1989) (discussing Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 
F.2d 3, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 321 (1st Cir. 1988)). 
250. Plaintiff Frances Lipman had purchased the painting (provided the funds) as a gift for 
plaintiffs Hobart and Norma Rosen. However, it was actually Hobart Rosen who negotiated with 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit approved of the trial court's disposition of the 
warranty claim. Willing to concede for the sake of argument that a painting 
"performs" for purposes of U.C.C. section 2-725, the court rejected the notion 
that the express warranty of authenticity was the equivalent of a "future 
performance" warranty.251 Moreover, because the forgery could have been 
detected at the time the painting was purchased, the situation was not one where 
discovery of the breach "must await" future performance. All, however, was not 
necessarily lost. The court went on to hold that although two of the plaintiffs 
did not technically qualify as buyers, their allegations were sufficient to state a 
separate and distinct claim of common law fraud.252 
The second case, Hu.ff v. Hobgood,253 involved a claim for breach of the 
warranty of good title.254 Huff purchased a used bulldozer from Hobgood in 
1978 and later sold it to Smith in 1983. As things turned out, the bulldozer had 
been stolen and, as a result, Smith was forced to repurchase it from the true 
owner's insurance company. After reimbursing Smith for his losses, Huff 
sought recovery from Hobgood. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the 
grant of summary judgment for Hobgood. The court, while acknowledging that 
warranty of title cases are rare, saw no reason to treat them differently from the 
more familiar cases involving the warranties of merchantability or fitness for a 
particular purpose. Unfortunately for Huff, this meant that the limitations 
period began to run in 1978 when the bulldozer was tendered.255 
The third case is American Alloy Steel, Inc. v. Armco, lnc.256 In contrast to 
the indemnification claim in Huff, which was factually atypical, the claim in 
Armco was commonplace. American Alloy purchased steel plating from Armco 
the defendant. As a result, the district court felt that there had been no detrimental reliance by the 
Rosens and no misrepresentations made to Frances Lipman. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 853. 
251. U.C.C. section 2-725(2) adopts a date-of-discovery rule "where a warranty explicitly 
extends to future performance . . . and discovery of the breach must await the time of such 
performance .... " The actual warranty, which appeared on the seller's invoice, stated: "[t]his 
picture is fully guaranteed by the undersigned to be an original work by John Singer Sargent." 10 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 848. 
The court declined to accept plaintiffs' argument that the permanent quality of authenticity 
compelled a finding that the warranty extended to the future or the argument that New York law 
recognizes an explicitly future warranty when the good by its nature will perform over a period of 
time. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 850-51. 
252. In deciding the way it did, the court was careful to emphasize the unusual circumstances of 
the case. Only because the Rosens were permitted to select their gift were they able allege the 
requisite detrimental reliance, i.e., if they had known the truth a different, more valuable item 
would have been chosen. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 853-56. 
253. 549 So. 2d 951, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 856 (Miss. 1989): 
254. In addition to the implied warranty of title, see U.C.C. § 2-312, an express warranty was 
given. The relevant contract language stated that: "[t]he said property I guarantee is my own and 
free of all claims and offsets of any and all kinds." 549 So. 2d at 952, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 
857. 
255. It should be noted that Mississippi version U.C.C. section 2-725 provides for a six-year 
limitations period, rather than the four-year period in the Official Text. Miss. Code Ann. § 75-2-
725 (1972). 
256. 777 S.W.2d 173, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 861 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). 
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which was delivered to American Alloy's warehouse for storage pending resale 
to ultimate end users. More than four years later it was sold to Swecomex. 
When it was discovered that the steel was defective, American Alloy replaced it 
and filed suit against Armco.257 One by one the Texas Court of Appeals 
considered and rejected the various attempts of American Alloy to escape the 
stricture of U.C.C. section 2-725. According to the court there was no future 
performance warranty;258 the section is constitutional under both the U.S. and 
Texas constitutions;259 delivery in U.C.C. section 2-725(2) does not mean 
delivery to the end user;260 and the limitations period was not effectively waived 
by contract.261 
One argument apparently overlooked by the plaintiff and not addressed by 
the court in Armco was that the implied right of indemnity is outside the Code 
and not governed by U.C.C. section 2-725.262 However, this argument did 
surface and proved successful in City of Wood River v. Geer-Melkus Construc-
tion Co.263 Pursuant to its contract with the City of Wood River, Geer-Melkus 
constructed a waste water treatment facility in which it installed a rotating 
media aeration system purchased from Hormel. More than four years later, 
when the system broke down, Wood sued Geer-Melkus, and Geer-Melkus filed 
257. The facts indicated that it was allegedly impossible for American Alloy to have discovered 
the defects on its own. It was not until after burning and milling by Swecomex that they became 
discoverable. Id. at 174, to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 863. 
258. The court of appeals observed that the implied warranty of merchantability could not 
explicitly extend to the future performance of the good and the express warranty did not because it 
lacked a "specific reference to a specific date in the future." 777 S.W.2d at 176, to U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d at 864 (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 548, 1 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d 1237, 1242 (Tex. 1986)). 
259. The court disposed of the constitutional claim with dispatch, holding that "[a]doption of a 
uniform date of accrual and rejection of the discovery rule in warranty cases is a permissible means 
adopted by the state legislatures to protect commercial transactions." 777 S.W.2d at 177, to U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 2d at 865 (quoting Muss v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 734 S.W.2d 155, 158-59, 
4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1459, 1763 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
260. The court indicated that because the purpose of U.C.C. section 2-725 was sufficiently 
different from U.C.C. sections 2-314, 2-607, and 2-714, there was no need to harmonize the four 
sections by adopting a uniform construction of "delivery." 777 S.W.2d at 177, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d at 865. 
261. The waiver argument was based on the following contractual provision: "WAIVER. 
Failure or inability of either party to enforce any right hereunder shall not waive any right in 
respect to any other or future rights or occurrences." Id. at 177, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 865. 
The court held that this provision was not sufficiently specific to avoid the public policy ban on the 
enforceability of general agreements which waive in advance the statute of limitations. Id. at 177, 10 
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 866. 
262. Opinion is divided on the proper statute of limitations when the action is for indemnity. 
Compare PPG Indus. v. Genson, 135 Ga. App. 248, 217 S.E.2d 479, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 785 
(1975) (indemnity action subject to U.C.C. section 2-725); Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 
681 P.2d 214, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1274 (Utah 1984) (same); with McDermott v. City of N.Y., 50 
N.Y.2d 211, 406 N.E.2d 460, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1980) (U.C.C. section 2-725 not applicable); Cyr 
v. Michaud, 454 A.2d 1376 (Me. 1983) (same); Hanscome v. Perry, 75 Md. App. 605, 542 A.2d 
421, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1516 (1988) (same). 
263. 233 Neb. 179, 444 N.W.2d 305, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 957 (1989). 
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a third-party complaint against Hormel. The Supreme Court of Nebraska 
found that the third-party complaint raised an indemnification cause of action 
which first accrued when Geer-Melkus suffered loss or damage. Thus, U.C.C. 
section 2-725 was inapplicable. 
What would have happened if all warranties had been disclaimed in the 
initial sale to Geer-Melkus? Presumably, it would not have had a claim over 
against Hormel.264 This would suggest that regardless of its characterization, 
the "indemnification" cause of action is in reality grounded in a breach of 
warranty and, as such, should be treated accordingly. The fact that Geer-
Melkus had no way of discovering the breach until the limitation period of 
U.C.C. section 2-725 had run is good reason to revise the statute, not to subvert 
its present scope. 
Another way to resist the sometimes unjust consequences of the statute's date-
of-delivery rule is to argue that the defendant's conduct precludes its use. The 
courts usually have denied such claims265 but, as Hydra-Mac, Inc. v. Onan 
Corp.266 proves, they occasionally prevail. In this case, International Harvester 
Company ("International Harvester") purchased skid loaders from Hydra-Mac 
with engines manufactured by Onan. From the outset, International Harvester 
knew that the engines were not performing well. Finally, after repeated at-
tempts to remedy the problems, Onan gave up and admitted that the engines 
could never be repaired. By the time Hydra-Mac and International Harvester 
finally got around to suing Onan, it had been more than four years since the 
engines were delivered to Hydra-Mac. After dealing with the issue of whether 
the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was applicable and determining that it 
was not,267 the Supreme Court of Minnesota turned to the issue of equitable 
estoppel.268 It concluded that the case would have to be remanded in order to 
allow the trial court to determine whether International Harvester exercised 
due diligence in bringing suit once it became apparent that Onan's repair 
promises could not be kept. Having reached this conclusion, the court refused to 
decide whether the promises tolled the statute of limitations.269 
264. The assumption is that the right of indemnification is recognized because of breach of 
contract, not tortious conduct on the part of Hormel. 
265. For example, during this survey period courts declined to apply the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel in the following cases: Deters v. Columbia Heights Motors, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 101 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Connaught Laboratories, Inc. v. Lewis, 557 A.2d 40, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
2d 134 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1989). 
266. 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 740 (Minn. 1990). 
267. The law of tolling of statutes of limitations, including the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
ment, is explicitly saved by U.C.C. section 2-725(4) ("[t]his section does not alter the law on tolling 
of the statute of limitations .... "). While Onan might have concealed its inability to ever fix the 
engines, the problems were known to all concerned. This, the court thought, was enough to negate 
the claim of concealment. 
268. The court noted the following elements to the estoppel: "( 1) that promises or inducements 
were made; (2) that it reasonably relied upon the promises; and, (3) that it will be harmed if 
estoppel is not applied." 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 749. 
269. Buyers frequently argue that the seller's unsuccessful repair attempts toll the statute of 
limitations. Courts, however, have been generally unreceptive to this so-called "repair theory." See 
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Another possible way to extend the statute is to argue that some other statute, 
not U.C.C. section 2-725, is controlling. However, in a suit by a seller to recover 
the purchase price, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that U.C.C. section 
2-725 governed, not the six-year period for simple contracts.270 In another 
context, it was held that the strict products liability statute governed in a suit by 
a school district to recover the costs of asbestos removal.271 
ARTICLE SIX (BULK SALES) 
Article 6 provides that a noncomplying bulk transfer is "ineffective" against 
the creditors of the transferor.272 What seems clear is that one remedy afforded 
aggrieved creditors is the ability to reach the transferred goods. Unclear, 
however, is whether that is their only remedy. In Streamlight, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Health & Safety Corp. (In re Streamlight, Inc.),273 the creditor, a seller of 
health care products, sought a judgment against the noncomplying transferee/ 
defendant equal to the value of its products actually received by the defen-
dant.274 Applying New York law, the bankruptcy court ruled that the defendant 
would be personally liable for the fair value of the merchandise transferred only 
to the extent that the merchandise was no longer in its possession and identifi-
able. 275 Accordingly, the defendant was ordered to account to the creditor for the 
present status or disposition of the merchandise. 
Revised article 6 clarifies the consequences of the buyer's failure to comply.276 
It specifically provides that noncompliance will not render the sale ineffective or 
otherwise affect the buyer's title to the goods; rather, the liability of a noncom-
plying buyer will be for damages caused by the noncompliance.277 
In Key Capital Corp. v. M & S Liquidating Corp.,278 the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts had occasion to define the words "major part" as used in U.C.C. 
Kanovitz, The Seller Fiddles and the Clock Ticks: Seller's Cure and the U.C.C. Statute of 
Limitations, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 318 (1985). 
270. See Rivers Mach. Co., Inc. v. Barclay Int'!, 553 So. 2d 579, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 890 
(Ala. 1989). 
271. See Drayton Public School District No. 19 v. W.R. Grace & Co., 728 F. Supp. 14to 
(D.N.D. 1989). 
272. u.c.c. §§ 6-to4(1), 6-105. 
273. 108 Bankr. 505, to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
274. This was probably a ·mistake. Nothing in article 6 would suggest a reduction in the amount 
of the creditor's claim from that which is owed by the debtor/transferor. Fortunately for the 
creditor, the bankruptcy court recognized the mistake. It noted that "the relief provided ... may 
make it possible for the [debtor], to collect its entire judgment against the [creditor] ... . "Id. at 511, 
to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 1377. 
275. The court relied on New York caselaw, see Jn re Curtina Int'!, 23 Bankr. 969, 34 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 1311(S.D.N.Y.1982), and the fact that New York has enacted a very limited version of 
U.C.C. section 6-to6. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 6-112 (transferee liable only for certain taxes owed by the 
transferor). 
276. Revised article 6 (cited herein as "revised U.C.C.") has been adopted by California, 
Oklahoma, and Utah. 
277. See Revised U.C.C. § 6-to7. 
278. 27 Mass. App. Ct. 721, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 710 (1989). 
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section 6-102(1).279 The transferor/debtor had transferred somewhere between 
23% and 26% of its inventory of meat and meat products. The court held that 
this transaction did not constitute a bulk sale because it did not meet the 
quantitative test of article 6. In so doing it adopted the bright line test favored by 
the overwhelming majority of courts and commentators: "the words 'major part' 
... mean, as a matter of law, more than (50%) of the property transferred, 
measured by value."280 The definition of "bulk sale" in revised article 6 
expressly adopts this interpretation. 281 
Not every transaction which meets the general definition of a bulk transfer 
necessitates compliance with article 6. The case of Baltimore Luggage Co. v. 
Holtzman 282 demonstrates that even if the transfer is not expressly excepted 
from the Act's coverage under U.C.C. section 6-103, a court may nonetheless be 
willing to excuse noncompliance. In Holtzman, the transaction was in all 
respects an arm's length transaction under which the transferee assumed sub-
stantially all of the seller's liabilities and obligations, and the seller acknowl-
edged and retained the rest: specifically, the obligations arising under its 
employment contract with the plaintiff.283 Concluding that none of the purposes 
of article 6 would be frustrated if a non-fraudulent transaction of this type was 
outside its scope,284 the court held that compliance was unnecessary. What the 
court misses is the entire point of a bulk sales act. By providing for notice before 
the sale it affords creditors the opportunity to police the transaction and makes 
available to them remedies which would be lost or worthless after the sale.285 
Moreover, some of these remedies (garnishment, for example) are available 
regardless of whether the sale is fraudulent or not. 
279. U.C.C. section 6-102(1) provides: "A 'bulk transfer' is any transfer in bulk and not in the 
ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise 
or other inventory ... of an enterprise subject to this Article." 
280. 27 Mass. App. Ct. at 725, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 714. If a "substantial part" of 
equipment is transferred in conjunction with a bulk transfer of inventory, that transfer too is subject 
to article 6. See U.C.C. § 6-102(2). The court, quoting 6 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code 
Series 6-102:09 ( 1984), makes the point that unlike the words "major part" no consensus exists on 
the meaning of "substantial part" 'other than it means something quantitatively less than "major." 
Id. at 725, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 714 n.6. 
281. See revised U.C.C. § 6-102(1)(c). 
282. 562 A.2d 1286, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 953 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989). 
283. The court raises but does not answer the question of whether an employee under a contract 
is a creditor for purposes of article 6. 
284. The two purposes identified by the court were: ( 1) protection of the transferor's creditors 
from a fraudulent transfer of assets, and (2) protection of complying purchasers against attachment 
of or levy on the transferred goods. 562 A.2d at 1294, to U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 958. 
285. See U.C.C. § 6-105 Comment 1 ("This section is the heart of the Article. It requires notice 
to creditors of all bulk transfers subject to the Article .... "). After the sale has taken place the 
proceeds may have vanished and the assets transferred may have been resold or encumbered. 
Furthermore, pre-sale remedies such as injunction will no longer be feasible. 
1506 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 46, August 1991 
ARTICLE SEVEN (DOCUMENTS OF TITLE) 
Two cases concern the effectiveness of a limitation of liability provision in a 
document of title where the bailed goods have disappeared from the bailee's 
premises under unknown circumstances. The relevant article 7 sections validate 
limitation of liability provisions in warehouse receipts and bills of lading unless 
the bailee has converted the bailed goods to its own use.286 
In Ferrex Int'l. Inc. v. M/V Rico Chone287 the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland, applying Maryland law, enforced such a provision on the 
ground that the owner of the bailed goods had failed to prove a prima facie case 
of conversion. In that case the owner (Ferrex) delivered several packages of 
welding rods to the dock operator (Clark Maryland Terminals) for storage until 
the arrival of the ship on which the rods were to be transported. When the ship 
arrived the rods were found to be missing. It was never proved how the rods 
actually disappeared. The owner of the rods sued the dock operator who 
defended on the basis of a provision in the dock receipt limiting its liability to 
$500 per package unless a higher valuation had been declared (which the owner 
had not).288 The owner argued that the dock operator's failure to return goods 
bailed to it raised a presumption of conversion, and that to rebut that presump-
tion the dock owner must produce more than just speculative evidence about 
what happened to the bailed goods. The district court disagreed. It held that the 
unexplained disappearance of bailed goods gave rise to a presumption of 
negligence not conversion. The burden remained upon the owner to prove that 
the goods had disappeared under circumstances amounting to conversion by the 
bailee. This burden the owner failed to carry. The presumption of negligence 
was useless, since the limitation of liability provision was effective even if the 
dock operator negligently caused the loss. 289 Therefore, the court granted 
summary judgment for the dock operator. 
In Calvin Klein Ltd. v. Trylon Trucking Corp. 290 the Second Circuit, 
applying New York law, held that a limitation of liability provision in a 
trucking invoice was effective even where the carrier had been grossly negligent. 
In that case the owner of the goods and the shipper had done business on 
numerous occasions over the last three years before suit. In each instance, the 
trucker would pick up a shipment from the airport and transport it to the 
owner's facilities. After completing the job, the carrier would forward to the 
owner an invoice containing a limitation of liability provision. The shipment 
giving rise to this suit was stolen by the driver of the truck and never recovered. 
Since the carriage was never completed the carrier issued no invoice for this 
shipment. The owner sued the carrier, who defended on the basis of the 
limitation of liability provision in its previous invoices. The parties stipulated 
286. U.C.C. § 7-204(2) (warehouse receipt); U.C.C. § 7-309(2) (Bill of Lading). 
287. 718 F. Supp. 451, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 960 (D. Md. 1988). 
288. See ICC Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse Co., 50 N.Y.2d 657, 431N.Y.S.2d372, 409 
N.E.2d 849, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 217 (1980). 
289. Cf U.C.C. § 7-204 Comment. 
290. 892 F.2d 191, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 970 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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that the carrier had been grossly negligent in hiring the truck driver, and that 
the contract of carriage for the stolen shipment included the limitation of 
liability provision. The district court held for the owner. It ruled that the 
limitation of liability provision had not been assented to by the owner. Since no 
invoice had been issued for the stolen shipment, the court declined to infer assent 
from the parties' previous course dealings. The district court also ruled that 
gross negligence would not override the limitation of liability provision. The 
Second Circuit reversed and remanded. It held the question of whether the 
owner had assented to the limitation of liability provision to be foreclosed by the 
parties' stipulation that this provision was part of the contract. It agreed with 
the district court that gross negligence would not override that provision. 
In Michigan National Bank v. Michigan Livestock Exchange291 the Michi-
gan Supreme Court found liable in conversion an auctioneer who acted in good 
faith in selling livestock covered by a security interest. In that case the secured 
creditor had loaned money to the debtors and had taken a security interest 
(which it perfected) in the debtors' cattle. The auctioneer sold the cattle without 
knowledge of the security interest and remitted the proceeds to. the debtors. In a 
conversion suit against the auctioneer by the secured creditor, the trial court 
granted summary judgment for the secured creditor. The court of appeals 
reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider the applicability of U.C.C. 
section 7-404. That section protects from liability a good faith bailee who acts 
reasonably and delivers goods in accordance with the terms of the document of 
title.292 The trial court reinstated its summary judgment for the secured creditor, 
holding U.C.C. section 7-404 not to be applicable. The court of appeals 
reversed and entered summary judgment for the auctioneer holding that section 
7-404 shielded the auctioneer from liability. The Michigan Supreme Court 
reversed the court of appeals. It concluded that section 7-404 did not apply to 
the auctioneer for several reasons: first, the auctioneer was not an article 7 
bailee, that is, a bailee for storage or transportation; second, the trucker's receipt 
issued by the auctioneer was not a document of title.293 The court's conclusion 
that section 7-404 does not cover an auctioneer is consistent with the caselaw.294 
291. 439 N.W.2d 884, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 366 (Mich. 1989). 
292. U.C.C. § 7-404 provides: 
NO LIABILITY FOR GOOD FAITH DELIVERY PURSUANT TO RECEIPT 
OF BILL. 
A bailee who in good faith including observance of reasonable commercial standards 
has received goods and delivered or otherwise disposed of them according to the terms of 
the document of title or pursuant to this Article is not liable therefor. This rule applies 
even though the person from whom he received the goods had no authority to procure the 
document or to dispose of the goods and even though the person to whom he delivered the 
goods had no authority to receive them. 
293. The court also held that U.C.C. section 9-307( 1) did not shield the auctioneer from 
liability. See 439 N.W.2d at 892-95, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 377-81. 
294. See the authorities cited by the court, 439 N.W.2d at 892, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d at 
376-77. See also Johnson v. New Holland Sales Stable, Inc., 71 Lane. L. Rev. 925, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d 323 (Pa. C.P. 1989). 
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Several jurisdictions have sought to remedy the auctioneer's difficult situation by 
statute, usually amending U.C.C. section 9-307(1).295 
295. See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws§ 440.9307 discussed 439 N.W.2d at 895-98, 9 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. 2d at 381-86. Cf Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1631(West1988). 
